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Abstract
Understanding what causes countries to be in a state of violent conflict is of vital
importance to developing realistic national strategies on both a regional and global
scale. Given these causes, it is important to understand the effects of missing data,
how to impute that data, and the interrelation between data elements. Utilizing
both open source data and previously generated equations that predict a country’s
likelihood to transition conflict statuses, this research projects data into the future and
predicts each nations’ subsequent conflict statuses. Future data is populated using a
novel approach inspired by stochastic regression imputation. The replicated future
data and predictions were interpreted as alternative futures of regional conflict in
both the Arab world and Southeast Asia. The conflict occurrences in the Arab world
region were projected to trend upward compared to the region’s historic behavior.
In Southeast Asia, the next ten years forecasted a decline in total violent conflicts.
Regional scenarios where the elements of national power influenced a data element
were implemented to learn how alternative futures might be effected. These results
can inform military and political leadership on the ever changing conflict landscapes
in two world regions of immense political and strategic importance.
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AN IMPUTATION APPROACH TO DEVELOPING
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES OF COUNTRY CONFLICT
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Over the course of human history, the world’s countries have continually transitioned in
and out of states of violent conflict. These conflicts range from small unarmed bouts to deadly
world wars and have become a major area of study for nations trying to understand and
mitigate the threats brought on by potential conflict and regional instability. The Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) identified 385 conflicts globally in 2017
[1]. Each nation in a defined state of conflict experienced varying levels of intensity, involved
nations, and influential factors. Due to the uniqueness of each individual conflict, there have
been multiple research efforts to build accurate predictive models of armed conflict. These
models have ranged from incorporating every nation in the world down to instances within
a single nation. Rooted in a United States Combatant Commands approach to grouping
nations, previous predictive models of country conflict have achieved highly accurate results
[2]. Recent studies largely focused on finding the most influential variables for predicting
observed conflicts, while this still begs the question of how to project future data and predict
conflicts that will emerge or stagnate over the years to come.
This research examines predicting a country’s conflict based on generated future data of
two world regions where their groupings are based on both geographical proximity and data
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similarity. Alternative futures of conflict transitions were calculated for the nations in two
historically warring world regions of national interest. With a forecasted outline of a region’s
conflict transitions, a nation can improve their resource allocation and strategic planning to
address changing future conflict intensities.
1.2 Problem Statement
Fill the missing observations in the data set utilized by Neumann [3] through testing and
identifying each variable’s optimal imputation method. Develop regression models for each
variable of interest for the two selected world regions. For those selected regions, iteratively
create alternative futures for conflict transitions until 2030 and solve for each nation’s yearly
conflict status. Perform region specific what-if analysis to test the robustness of each of their
future conflict environments.
1.3 Research Objectives
The objective of this study is to implement defensible imputation techniques that ad-
dresses each region’s data missingness and to develop alternative futures of each regional
conflict landscape using an iterative imputation style explanatory forecasting method.
1.4 Research Questions
This study seeks to answer the following research questions on alternate futures of conflict
transitions in the Arab and Southeast Asia world regions.
Question 1
How should the data set utilized in the Neumann study be imputed?
Question 2
2
How can this research develop regression models for each region’s variables of interest?
Question 3
What insights, nations susceptible or impervious to transitioning in or out violent conflict
are identified by the projected conflict alternative futures?
Question 4
How robust are the alternative futures of conflict transitions when subject to regional
what-if scenarios?
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
This study is based on three underlying assumptions. The first assumption, similar to
other conflict prediction research, is that the data analyzed is accurate and describes all
commonalities between countries and their conflicts. The second assumption is that Neu-
mann’s [3] geographic groupings into regions were assumed to have suitable commonalities in
terms of economies, locations, ethnicities, and religious demographics to develop alternative
futures. The third assumption is that the variables identified as significant for Neumann’s
[3] conflict logistic regression models are the only relevant variables for predicting conflict
during the duration of future years. This assumption means that Neumann’s models remain
significant predictors of country conflict transitions despite the regional conflict environments
and data changing with time.
Data availability or completeness was addressed in this research by applying multiple
imputation techniques to the unobserved gaps in the data. After combining multiple open
sources, over half of the data’s variables required imputation. A completed data set was
then used to generate future data. The level of uncertainty behind the imputed values
limited the fits of the regression models. Additionally, computing power and time limited
the variables extrapolated. Only those variables found to be significant in each region’s
conflict prediction models were projected into the future as opposed to all of the variables
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available. A greater degree of fidelity could have been achieved by informing the alternative
futures with more data. Despite the inherent limitations of this research, it remains to
provide national leadership with complete data, a tested forecasting method, and future,
realistic country conflict landscapes to consider when developing foreign policy and security
strategies.
1.6 Overview
This thesis is organized into 5 chapters including chapter 1, this introduction chapter.
Chapter 2 contains a literature review of prominent studies and methods relating to this
research. Chapter 3 discusses the study’s methodology to impute the data and develop the
alternative futures of conflict transitions. Chapter 4 details the results and analyses, and
chapter 5 offers final conclusions and possibilities for future research.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background of previous influential research on
country conflict prediction. It forms the basis of this research as well as explains the existing
contributions to imputation and conflict prediction. This chapter is broken down into three
main sections: existing nation-state conflict modeling, applied imputation techniques, and
related forecasting applications. The first section focuses on previously developed predictive
models for nation-state conflict that lead to the very one employed by this research. The
second section identifies similar imputation methods and comparison strategies which inform
this research’s handling of missing data. The final section provides a summary of related ap-
plications of explanatory forecasting efforts. This chapter ultimately aims to cover literature
about the main models, methods, and applications related to this research.
2.2 Previous Nation-State Conflict Models
Predicting world conflict has been a problem addressed by multiple studies. There have
been different prediction methodologies where researchers have defined conflict, the influen-
tial variables, and how best to group countries prior to predicting their conflicts. There have
been varying accuracies achieved by these predictive modeling efforts. This section outlines
the progress already made in predicting conflict which is a key component of this research’s
alternative futures of violent conflict.
The 2013 research, Learning from the Past and Stepping into the Future: Toward a New
Generation of Conflict Prediction, focused on the benefits that prediction models of political
5
conflict in a complicated geopolitical landscape could provide [4]. The authors defended
the importance of country conflict prediction and identified limitations in previous research.
Previous research had fixated on including statistically significant variables while overlooking
a variable’s impact on the model’s overall predictive accuracy. Ward [4] developed a model
of behavioral and institutional variables to predict various countries cumulative probability
of civil war, six months prior to it’s onset. This hierarchical logit model’s slope and intercept
differed depending on groups of nations, and it accurately predicted civil wars 95% of the
time. Ward’s [4] research was the first to put a greater deal of importance on prediction
accuracy in contrast to just building models with significant variables. Until the Ward
[4] study and Goldstone’s [5] efforts, conflict models’ prediction accuracies were limited to
around 50% [2].
The study, A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability, conducted by Dr. Jack
Goldstone [5] for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence predicted
the onset of political instability two years prior to a conflict’s start . The research took open
source global data from 1955 to 2003 and performed a variety of predictive analyses to achieve
80% accuracy determining between countries that experienced political instability from those
in a constant state [5]. Goldstone’s [5] study found a nonlinear five-category measure of
regime type to be the most powerful predictor rather than economic conditions, demography,
or geography. Country conflict, the dependent variable, was defined as a revolutionary war,
ethnic war, adverse regime changes, or genocides and politicides [5]. Of the predictive event
history models, logistic regression, neural networks, and Markov processes tested, the simple
logistic regression model performed best with only four independent variables [5]. These
results informed future researchers of the importance of fewer, major variables to reduce the
unexplained variance of the conflict models as well as logistic regression being the favorable
method for political instability prediction. Goldstone’s model was built on a world scale and
ignored the differences between nations’ locations and underlying cultures. In fact, the sole
region modeled separately, Africa, included different variables for predicting conflict which
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indicates the pertinence of regional differences [5].
The Center for Army Analysis’s research, Recognizing Patterns of Nation-State Instability
that Lead to Conflict identified the influential factors for predicting country conflict for Army
operations. Shearer’s [6] work initially mapped the top four intensity levels of an older,
slightly different version of the HIIK conflict intensity score into two categories: peace and
conflict [6]. This indicator of a nation’s conflict status was the model’s dependent variable.
Thirteen variables from unclassified data on diplomatic, social, economic, and military factors
of each country acted as the model’s regressors [6]. Principal component analysis was applied
to better visualize the data in a reduced three dimensional feature space. The study further
used a smoothing algorithm to forecast future vectors. Using k-Nearest Neighbors and
Nearest Centroid algorithms, Shearer [6] obtained a classification accuracy of 85% for a
nation’s stability over time. The research introduced an understandable way to view the
data and define, on a global scale, a nation’s likelihood of conflict while predicting further
into the future with comparable precision.
Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010-2050 explained global and regional incidences of armed
conflict using a multinominal logit model trained on cross-sectional data for 169 countries
from 1970-2009 [7]. The model made predictions on the likelihood of a nation transition-
ing between no conflict, minor conflict, and major conflict. The three transition states
were determined by the combat related deaths per year, and predictions were calculated by
simulating the behavior of the conflict variable implied by the model’s estimates [7]. The
research’s regional based model building strategy accounted for countries’ geographically
driven differences. The world was divided into eight regions from a compressed version of
the United Nations’ groupings and included unique regressors for each. Six separate models
were developed using varying combinations of independent variables that emphasized the in-
fluence of conflict history, country development, and neighboring behavior on conflict status
[7]. The simulated future data was based on proposed scenarios and projections of demo-
graphic trends over time with the the multinominal logit coefficients changing yearly until
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converging [7]. With a unique prediction horizon between 7-9 years, an average postdictive
accuracy of 79% with a false positive rate of 8.5% was found across all nine regions analyzed
[7]. This study set a precedent of a multi level conflict matrix that allowed for the inclu-
sion of predicting ongoing as well as initialized conflicts. The study simultaneously predicts
escalation, onset, and the termination of conflicts which expands the work’s application to
global and regional prediction.
Building on previous theses and leading to the very predictive models featured in this
research, Boekestein [8] first adapted the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Re-
search “Levels of Conflict” as the dependent variable for logistic regression. Violent conflicts
were defined by the highest three HIIK scores (3-violent crisis, 4-limited war, 5-war) while a
country not in conflict took on one of the lower three HIIK levels (0-no conflict, 1-dispute,
2-non-violent conflict) [8]. Boekestein [8] data compiled various open sources to encompass
twenty six variables. These were used to build individual parsimonious models for the six
regions shaped from insights by credible statistician Hans Rosling. The study found in-
fluential variables for each region’s model through variance inflation factor screening and
correlation testing that produced models with a maximum prediction accuracy of 76% [8].
With a reduced logistic regression cutoff of 0.28 as opposed to the default 0.5, Boekestein
[8] constructed separate regional models with varying subsets of variables that attained a
postdictive accuracy around 80%. This studies resulting conflict prediction capabilities were
comparable to the previously mentioned Center for Army Analysis research.
Shallcross’s [2] work expanded on the Boekestein [8] analysis by introducing a nation
specific Markov Chain model to forecast nations’ tendencies to transition in or out of conflict.
The Markovian models were based on the country’s current conflict status to then determine
how it would behave the following year. The model comprised of two states mapped from
the HIIK conflict intensity scoring: in conflict and not in conflict [2]. The regional logistic
regression models’ dependent variables were the transition of conflict status, and two times
the models were created to account for the two possible conflict states of country could be in
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the year prior. Contingent upon a country’s conflict status the year prior, an “in conflict” or
“not in conflict” predictive model would be executed to find the probability of that a country
would change or remain conflict statuses [2]. With the field being increasingly curious how
nearby conflicts affect a nation’s environment, Shallcross [2] considered independent variables
for the product of the conflict intensity of nations directly sharing borders and the percent of
that total border shared. Shallcross [2] achieved overall prediction accuracies above the 80%
benchmark for his models and established the two state predictive modeling methodology
practiced by this research.
Expanding on the work of Shallcross [2], Leiby’s [9] study focused on incorporating envi-
ronmental factors, specifically water and neighboring country conflict, into prediction models
and analyzing their effects. For the same regions as Shallcross [2] and Boekestein [8], Leiby
[9] introduced two additional independent variables into the conditional logistic regression
equations that predicted each nation’s conflict. The introduced variables were the percent-
age of the total number of bordering countries in conflict and a binary variable indicating if
at least one bordering nation was in a state of conflict [9]. Bidirectional stepwise selection
based on each variables’ G statistics informed the variable reduction methods used for each
region’s models [9]. The environmental factors were forced into the models to identify their
impact, but incorporating them only marginally improved model parsimony and predictive
accuracy. Leiby’s [9] models were still able to achieve a training classification accuracy of
92%.
Taking advantage of previous research’s progress, Forecasting Country Conflict within
Modified Combatant Command Regions using Statistical Learning Methods built the most
recent conflict transition predictive models used by this research [3]. Neumann’s [3] models
were tailored to the regions identified by a modified k-means clustering algorithm. The re-
gional groupings differentiated countries based on data similarities and geographic proximity.
This grouping of nations improved each conditional logistic regression models that predicted
the likelihood of a country to transition into or out of conflict [3]. These new regional models
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were compared to others built for the current Combatant Command World Structure and
yielded training data classification accuracies exceeding 89% [3]. Neumann’s [3] methodol-
ogy of grouping countries into a modified version of the Combatant Commands improved
the overall forecasts of conflict transitions. These were the best results found in literature
to date, and the models utilized to predict country conflict transitions in this research.
2.3 Applied Imputation Techniques
Researchers have taken varying degrees of complexity to fill the missing gaps in their data.
This section aims to explore a few of the imputation approaches and methodologies recently
practiced. There is no consensus on how to perfectly impute data, but by understanding
related imputation efforts, this research is better informed to decide on a proven technique
to perform on any and all foreseen data missingness.
In the study, Overview of Missing Physical Commodity Trade Data and Its Imputation
Using Data Augmentation, incomplete physical commodity trade databases are imputed us-
ing simpler, traditional approaches and computationally complex stochastic methods [10].
The incomplete commodity trade data impedes the proper analysis of trade flow between
countries, and its missingness stemmed from non-compliance of reporter countries, confiden-
tiality issues, delays in data processing, or erroneous reporting [10]. The imputation meth-
ods tested were categorized into deterministic, single imputation approaches and stochastic
imputation. The deterministic methods included imputation by mean, interpolation, and
regression while the stochastic driven approaches included stochastic regression and more
complex iterative processes. The study identified a key advantage of the stochastic approach
is that instead of using a point estimate as the imputed value, a distribution of missing data
through multiple imputations is obtained to reflect uncertainty and maintain the variabil-
ity in the original data. These are both overlooked by the deterministic methods [10]. A
case study considered imports of ten primary commodities from China, France, the United
10
Kingdom, and the United States between 1978-2010 [10]. The percent missingness for the
ten variables ranged between 3.72% and 15.69%, and initially the data was transformed to
be normal despite most of the more complex imputation techniques being robust to any
violations of the normality assumption [10]. Auxiliary variables were included in the multi-
ple imputations based on the improved quality and reduced bias of their correlations with
incomplete variables [10]. This was a driving factor that inspired this research’s decision
to impute data with all available variables in a region before reducing the data set to just
each region’s variables of interest. The multiple imputation method applied in this study is
explained in full detail within this research’s methodology chapter. Synthesized estimates
were compared against actual observed observations using the normalized root mean square
error. The study found that the multiple imputation out-performed the substitution by
mean, interpolation, and regression methods [10]. The mean imputation method was found
to generate imputed values with the highest amount of deviations from the observed values,
and the proposed multiple imputations yielded the smallest errors [10].
On Multivariate Imputation and Forecasting of Decadal Wind Speed Missing Data applies
multiple imputations by chained equations and time series forecasting on the Department
of Meteorology’s daily wind speed data from 1995 through 2008 [11]. Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) imputation generated random draws from multidimensional probability dis-
tributions via Markov chains, a sequence of random variables in which the distribution of
each element depends on the value of the previous one [11]. Through MCMC, the research
simulated the entire joint posterior distribution of the unknown quantities and obtained
simulation based estimates of posterior parameters of interest. 28% of the months of wind
observations were missing [11]. MCMC was applied in a variable by variable fashion to fill
in the unobserved instances, and a time series analysis on the imputed data was performed
in order to then make forecasts. Forecasts were calculated using exponential smoothing by
an additive Holt-Winters prediction function with constant level and no seasonality assump-
tions [11]. When analyzing the differences between the imputed and original wind speed
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data, the study tested the standard of the multiple imputations to preserve the structure
and probability functions of the imputed data. A t test was completed and found no sig-
nificant difference between the original and imputed wind speed data sets, confirming the
high level of reliability provided by multiple imputations [11]. A similar test comparing the
original to imputed data was completed by this study to determine the superior imputation
method for a given variable.
In the article, Imputation for Multisource Data with Comparison and Assessment Tech-
niques, ridge regression and a state-space model, both of which take advantage of potential
correlations between data are tested to impute multisource data [12]. The data comes from
an experimental facility for non-regularly occurring events that collect information from four
sensors: seismic, acoustic, surveillance video, and domain-name system log data [12]. The
imputation by ridge regression is a constrained version of least squares regression that shrinks
coefficient estimates towards zero until reaching a fit. The ridge regression then predicts the
unobserved value of a certain feature. Dynamic linear models were the state-space technique
that allows relationships between features to vary with time [12]. The imputation methods
were compared by the mean absolute deviation between the imputed and observed values.
The study found that imputation using a dynamic linear model achieved the highest accu-
racy and most precise confidence intervals around the imputed values. These intervals were
an additional way the study assessed imputation techniques as opposed to the previously
seen root mean square error statistics [12].
2.4 Related Forecasting Applications
Making predictions on future data is a complicated field involving inherent uncertainties.
This section covers a few existing forecasting efforts similar to the alternative futures devel-
oped in this research. By understanding the related applications of forecasting, context is
provided into the departures this research makes from the current forecasting field.
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For country conflict prediction, Hegre [7] had generated predictions for future data from
the years 2010 to 2050 using simulated projections of predictor variables, as provided by
the United Nations World Population Prospects and the International Institute of Applied
Systems Analysis. Consulting expert opinion to develop future data with Hegre’s conflict
status predictive models showed an overall decline in global incidences of violent crimes.
The analysis attributed this decline to the improved country developmental factors: infant
mortality rate, education, and youth bulges [7]. It should be noted that Hegre’s long term
predictions are built upon projections and should be interpreted as long term global or
possibly regional conflict trends rather than specific national level predictions [2].
Non-parametric regression for space-time forecasting under missing data analyzes real
time spatio-temporal data sets experiencing missingness due to long periods of unobserved
sensors. The study tries to forecast future journey times of road links in central London,
UK using two non-parametric regression models: kernel regression and K-nearest neighbors
[13]. Traffic monitoring networks present a real time setting where imputed data are imme-
diately required for long term forecasting that informs road users of future traffic conditions
[13]. Kernel regression is a non-parametric regression technique that is used to estimate the
conditional expectation of a random variable. Forecasts are produced as a combination of
historical data points and weighted accordingly by the kernel function [13]. The London
Congestion Analysis Project network experiences missing data which is imputed using a
process called patching, replacing the missing values with estimates which vary according to
the number of points that are missing in succession [13]. Both models performed well for
forecasting spatio-temporal data sets that exhibit high levels of missing data. The forecasts
were simple too by only having a single parameter to train and using their single upstream
and downstream neighbors.
Taking a different approach, A Stepwise Regression Method for Forecasting Net In-
terchange Schedule presents a stepwise regression method for forecasting net interchange
schedules [14]. These power grid operational schedules are the sum of the electric power
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exchanges between an Independent System Operator/Regional Transmission Organization
and its neighbors. The paper proposed using stepwise regression which iteratively adds and
removes explanatory variables according to their significance in the training data to find a
reduced order model that is computationally effective and can forecast the future net inter-
change schedule [14]. Akaike Information Criterion was used to evaluate each explanatory
variable’s ability to increase the goodness of fit of the statistical model. Stepwise regres-
sion was modified by adding a set of random variables whose values are drawn from normal
and uniform distributions. The number of random variables was the same as the observed
explanatory variables and acted as empirical stopping criterion of the stepwise regression.
After some number of iterations, if the regression added more than three random explana-
tory variables to the regression model, the process stopped. A sliding window approach was
followed to create training and test data sets, and the study found that the statistical signif-
icance of the parameters depended on the net interchange schedule forecasting horizon [14].
The regression based on the reduced explanatory variable set produced a model with smaller
forecasting error in less computational time versus using the full explanatory variable set.
Similarly, this research will develop alternative futures using a reduced set of variables that
has been identified by Neumann [3] to be significant for predicting conflict transition in a
given region.
Pedroza’s [15] research takes a Bayesian approach to forecast mortality rates for the
period 1990-1999 based on U.S. male mortality data from 1959-1989. Forecasts of mortality
rates are vital to government agencies’ development of health policies and allocation of
government services’ funds. Mortality rates are the ratio of deaths to mid-year population
size for a given interval of age and time. A previously developed method by Lee and Carter
forecasts age-specific log-mortality rates with a multivariate normal model and estimates
the parameters using singular value decomposition with a random walk model with drift to
forecast their vector of future levels of mortality index [15]. The Bayesian model reformulated
Lee-Carter’s method as a state-space model and incorporated a Markov chain Monte Carlo
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method to draw samples from the joint posterior distribution of the parameters and to form
the posterior predictive distribution of the log-mortality rates [15]. The model iteratively
completes two steps, draw parameters from their respective conditional distributions and
simulates the level of mortality state vector. The Bayesian formulation of the Lee-Carter
model created wider prediction intervals which more accurately reflected the forecasting
error associated with the model and underlying uncertainty of the data and technique [15].
This research doesn’t go to such extensive modeling lengths but still aims to capture the
uncertainties present when forecasting.
Zhang’s [16] research tested a combined autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
and artificial neural networks (ANN) forecasting model to take advantage of the unique
strengths of each model. The study performs time series forecasting in which past obser-
vations of the same variable are collected and analyzed to develop a model describing the
underlying relationship from which the model extrapolates the time series into the future
[16]. ARIMA models can represent several different types of time series but are limited
by the pre-assumed linear form of the model. In an ARIMA model, the future value of a
variable is assumed to be a linear function of several past observations and random errors.
ANN have the flexible data-driven capability of modeling nonlinearity thus erasing the need
to specify a particular model form. An ANN model performs a nonlinear functional mapping
from the past observations of a variable to the future value. This research proposed hybrid
approach. It considers a time series composed of a linear autocorrelation structure and a
nonlinear component using both models and applies ARIMA to the linear component and
ANN to model the nonlinear related residuals from the ARIMA application. Three data sets
were chosen to demonstrate the proposed hybrid method: nonlinear sunspot data, Canadian
lynx trapping data, and British pound/US dollar exchange rate data [16]. The study found
with the three data sets that the hybrid model out performed each component model used
in isolation [16]. The research emphasized understanding the initial structure of the data
to apply the appropriate model and accurately forecast data. The forecasting techniques
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used focused on projecting single streams of data while this research investigates projecting
multiple, interwoven streams of data all at once.
2.5 Summary
This literature review provides background on previous models and techniques used to
develop a data set that adequately explains country conflict, how border conflicts affect a
nation’s likelihood of entering into a state of conflict, and what are the best ways to group
countries considering their conflict statuses. Logistic regression appears to be the most
effective way to predict and model conflict which is the method utilized by this research.
Imputing data has been studied in many different fields that applied simple to complex
strategies that helped influence the imputation technique chosen by this research. Making
predictions on future data sets or forecasting has been attempted and applied with varying
success. Uncertainty about the future drove most of the reviewed forecasting efforts to
account for varying levels of uncertainty in their models.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Overview
This research explores imputation techniques to first fill the missing gaps in the data
and develop linear regression models to develop alternative futures of nation-state conflict
for two major world regions. Section 3.2 describes the methodology used to develop the
data set. Section 3.3 explains each imputation method tested and used to fill in those
missing observations. Section 3.4 outlines the development and building procedures for
the linear regression models for each variable of interest. Section 3.5 outlines the single step
iterative method to create the alternate futures of each country and region. Figure 1 displays
this methodology flow with the dashed line representing the repeated, iterative loops that
the alternative futures generation took to produced multiple future data sets and obtain
operationally feasible results.
Collect data set
Imputation selection and
implementation
of missing data
Individual
variable regression
model generation
Single step
iterative
alternative
futures method
Utilize country
conflict logistic
regression models
Replicate for a given
future data set
Multiple future data sets
Statistical analysis of
each future data set
Conduct what-if
future analysis
Figure 1. Methodology Overview.
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3.2 Collect Data Set
The data utilized by this study recreates the Neumann [3] study’s data set which built
upon Leiby [9] and Shallcross’s [2] insights into compiling relevant data to predict country
conflict. The data initially consisted of 182 countries between 2004-2014 and included the
same independent, influential variables identified by the Neumann [3]. This study decided
to include military expenditure as a percentage of government spending despite Neumann
[3] omitting it due to a large portion of the variable being unobserved. For reasons later
discussed in Section 3.3, military expenditure as a percentage of government spending was
incorporated in the multivariate imputation of the data. This research added the same two
additional technology variables and two derived border conflict variables inspired by Leiby’s
[9] research. The dependent conflict transition variable was defined by the Neumann [3]
study, and all of these generated variables are explained fully in Section 3.4 where linear
regression is performed to explain the relationships present within the data.
This study assumed that all of the unobserved data are missing at random. This means
that the probability of being unobserved is not the same for all cases across the data, but
within an individual group of data’s observed values, there is an equal probability of an
observation missing [17]. The probability that a data point is missing within a group or
variable is the same. Assuming the data are missing at random is the foundation for this
research’s applied imputation methods that take advantage of the relationships between the
observed variables. The original data of all 182 countries was missing observations for 21
of the 32 variables over the past ten years. The missing observations accounted for about
6.79% of the data’s total observations.
Before applying more complex imputation methods, the variable polity IV’s missing
observations were filled using information provided by the fully observed regime type variable.
Goldstone’s CIA study created the regime type variable as an indicator of political instability
[5]. Regime type originally had 57 descriptors of a country’s government, and Boekestein [8]
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simplified the variable down to just a three level indicator. Regime type is fully observable
and the same each year for every country analyzed. The polity IV is an integer variable
ranging from -10 to 10 where a -10 means a country’s government is fully autocratic and 10
fully democratic. Specific polity IV indicators were given to those country’s with anarchies,
transitioning governments, or governments experiencing a foreign interruption. The missing
observations for polity IV were filled based on the regime type of a country by mapping the
three levels of regime type to an appropriate polity IV value as seen in Table 1.
Table 1. Mapping of Regime Type to Fill Missing Polity Values
Regime.Type Corresponding.Polity.Value
Central Ruling Party -10
Emerging, Transitional, Recent Change, and Disputed 0
Democratic 10
Neumann’s [3] research identified new groups of countries based on applying a Modified
K-Means Algorithm to the 2014 data of 182 selected countries. The groupings found by
the algorithm were noticeably based on similarities between countries’ data and locations.
Neumann’s [3] new groupings are how this study simplifies the original 182 countries down
to two regions that together accounted for 45 countries. Neumann’s [3] new COCOM 1 and 6
are the primary regions analyzed by this study. New COCOM 1 and 6 contain countries with
historically volatile conflict statuses which makes them interesting candidates for analyzing
future conflict transitions. The missingness of the first new region, largely located in the Arab
world region, was 7.21% while the second region of focus, Neumann’s sixth new COCOM
located largely in Southeast Asia had 9.74% of its observations missing. These regions were
missing more observations than the average of all the original regions which is to be expected
that in countries with higher conflict occurrences, they would be more likely to have their
data collection process obstructed at some point in the past ten years.
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3.3 Imputation Selection and Implementation
3.3.1 Mulitple Imputation by Chained Equations
Multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) was the method used to impute the
remaining missing observations. The MICE [18] package in R [19] allowed this method to be
applied to each multivariate data set of Neumann’s six world regions. Multiple imputation
creates m > 1 complete versions of the data by filling the missing observations with plausible
data values [17]. Using multiple imputed data sets helps address the statistical uncertainty
involved with imputing data. The MICE algorithm is a fully conditional specification impu-
tation method which means it imputes multivariate missing data in a variable-by-variable
manner [17]. MICE predicts a column of missing data as a the target variable in a regres-
sion equation with the all the other variables as the predictors unless other specified [18].
If a predictor is missing an observation, then the most recent iteration’s imputation value
is used to impute the target variable [18]. m chains are calculated in parallel, and after
around 15-20 iterations for one regression chain, the regression coefficients for each missing
variables’ models are likely to converge [17]. MICE is a Markov chain Monte Carlo method
in which the state space consists of of all imputed values. The MICE algorithm must satisfy
three properties for its regression parameters to converge, just as any Markov chain would
converge to a stationary distribution.
• irreducible, the chain must be able to reach all interesting parts of the state space
• aperiodic, the chain should not oscillate between different states
• recurrence, all interesting parts can be reached infinitely often at least from almost all
starting points
The first step to fill in the initial missing data observations was checking to see if the
MICE algorithm was converging for each region. Van Buuren [17] identified there being no
clear-cut method for determining whether the MICE algorithm has converged but that suit-
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able imputations can be spotted from plotting one or more parameters versus the iteration
number. The means and standard deviations were plotted for each variable’s imputation
streams. Healthy converges were categorized by freely intermingled different streams, with-
out showing any trends and the variance between different sequences not being larger than
the variance within each individual sequence. No variables requiring imputation indicated
any notable unhealthy levels of convergence.
After looking at MICE applied to this analysis’s data and seeing previous research’s
MICE convergences [17], around 20 iterations was sufficient for the algorithm to converge.
Each imputation conducted by this research was run for 20 iterations. MICE allows for
several different univariate imputation techniques to be specifically applied to each variable
every pass. MICE utilizes the columns of fully observed data in these chains. Imputing with
a subset of only the missing data or simplified data set may deprive the MICE algorithm
of information from the fully observed columns of data. For this reason, each imputation
was performed with the missing and complete variables to include even variables deemed
insignificant by Neumann’s [3] models in a certain region. Multiple imputation procedurally
imputes the data, analyzes each imputed data set separately, and pools the results. The
initial imputation began with investigating which MICE method resulted in the data most
similar to the distribution of observed data. The five mice methods tested were inspired by
Brantely’s [20] imputation testing methodology and displayed in Table 2.
Table 2. Imputation Methods Tested
Method Description
cart Classification and regression trees
pmm Predictive mean matching
norm Bayesian linear regression
rf Random forrest
mean Unconditional mean imputation
Between all of the six regions, there were on average about twelve variables per region
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that required imputation. MICE has the ability to impute and utilize categorical variables.
Thirteen variables in Arab region of nations were missing observations while fourteen of
the Southeast Asia region’s variables required imputing. MICE creates dummy variables
for the categorical variables and generates their regressions and resulting imputations from
these [18]. None of the variables requiring imputation were categorical, but there were
categorical variables such as regime type included in the prediction of other missing variables.
The MICE imputation methods investigated were selected based on there not being any
missing categorical variables and trying to test a wide variety of methods. Imputation using
classification and regression trees (CART) seek predictors and cut points in the predictors
used to divide up the sample of data. The data are split up repeatedly until a binary
tree is built to determine a target, imputed value [17]. CART methods for imputation are
robust against outliers, can handle multicollinearity and skewed distributions, and are able
to fit interactions and nonlinear relationships [17]. Predictive mean matching (pmm) is an
imputation technique which utilizes the observed data to calculate the predicted target value.
It takes a random draw from the candidate donors of complete cases with predicted values
closest to the predicted missing entry value [17]. The norm method applies Bayesian linear
regression that uses parameter uncertainty from random draws from a posterior probability
distribution based on the observed data [17]. The random forest method uses Breiman’s
random forest algorithm which is essentially a combination of CART, tree predictions where
the splits to arrive at classified value are found randomly [18].
3.3.2 Testing Imputation Methods
Each of the MICE methods were run to develop five different imputed data sets per
region and then compared using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and non-parametric, 2-
sample Anderson-Darling (A-D) tests. The K-S test looks at if the imputed data values
are similar to the observed data values. This test makes the assumption that the imputed
data should follow the same distribution as the observed data [21]. Engmann and Cousineau
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[22] compared both the A-D and K-S tests and found that the A-D performed better when
analyzing moments and small differences in the tails of distributions. Based on these findings,
the A-D test for this analysis will be the main differentiator between imputation methods
[20]. The null hypothesis behind both of these tests is that the distributions come from
the same parent distribution. A small p value indicates that the imputed data and original
data are significantly different and can be interpreted as a poor imputation method. For
some variables missing a high percentage of observations such as freshwater per capita which
was missing for ~74% of observations, no imputation method was able to find statistical
similarity between that method’s imputed and observed distributions.
In some literature the mean absolute error and root mean square error have been used to
assess the performance of an imputation method. This analysis didn’t utilize these measures
of accuracy based on the difference between the true and imputed data. Due to there being
so few complete cases for certain variables, evaluation metrics that were based on knowing
the true values for missing data weren’t implemented. Van Buuren [17] also detailed the
shortcomings of treating imputation as a prediction problem geared towards finding the
best value. The goal of multiple imputations is “to obtain statistically valid inferences from
incomplete data” [17]. Also treating imputations as methods to enhance the classification
accuracy may favor strange imputation methods [17]. For these reasons, evaluating and
choosing an imputation method becomes an increasingly complex problem. Van Buuren’s
[17] warning as well as the conflicting results and ties between the K-S and A-D statistical
tests begged for another imputation evaluation metric be applied to decide on a method.
Diagnostic plots were implemented lastly to asses the plausibility of each imputation method:
kernel density and box and whisker plots. The box and whisker plot was chosen over strip
plots based on Van Buuren’s [17] recommendation that the box and whisker plot is more
appropriate for large data sets. Both these plots compare the discrepancies between the
observed and imputed data. Dramatic differences would signify a possibility that something
with the imputed data be further investigated [17]. The diagnostic plots were used to validate
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the results of the A-D and K-S tests as well as break any potential ties from seeing which
imputed values from a given method were more realistic. For example, the variable freshwater
per capita from the Arab region had all five imputed values significantly different from the
observed data when tested using the A-D and K-S tests. The box and whisker and kernel
density plots were then examined to observe differences between imputation techniques. A
suitable imputation technique would produce values that could be observed if the data had
not been missing at all [18]. The best performing plots had imputed data visually closest
to the observed data. After applying the K-S and A-D statistical tests and inspecting the
diagnostic plots, individual imputation methods were determined for each variable in a given
region and are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Imputation Methods Used for Each Variable by Region
Variable Arab Southeast Asia
Caloric.Intake cart rf
Freedom.Score pmm
Freshwater.per.Capita cart cart
GDP.Per.Capita cart rf
Improved.Water.Source pmm pmm
Internet.Users pmm pmm
Military.Expend.GDP pmm rf
Military.Expend.Gov.Spending cart rf
Mobile.Cell.Subs pmm
Population.Growth pmm
Refugee.Asylum pmm pmm
Refugee.Origin pmm
Religious.Diversity pmm
Trade.percent.GDP pmm pmm
Unemployment pmm
X2.Year.Freedom.Trend pmm
X3.Year.Freedom.Trend pmm
X5.Year.Freedom.Trend pmm
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3.3.3 Imputation Challenges
A problem that arose specifically within the Southeast Asia region is some variables are
highly correlated. When the MICE algorithm builds the regression equation to predict a
missing value, a variable that is a linear combination of another will result in a singularity
error that halts the MICE algorithm. To fix this, redundant variables must be excluded from
the set of predictor variables used by MICE. The dependent variables can be identified by
the last eigenvector of the covariance matrix of the data after performing listwise deletion
[18]. The variable mobile cell subscriptions was highly correlated (> 0.5) with multiple
variables. Mobile cell subscriptions had by far the smallest loading (2.012761e − 11) on
the last eigenvector of the covariance matrix. For these reasons, mobile cell subscriptions
was imputed individually using MICE univariate imputation techniques, and when imputed
separately, the singularity errors ceased to disrupt the MICE algorithm.
3.4 Individual Variable Regression Model Generation
With the complete data from 2004-2014, linear regression models were built for each
variable of interest. Neumann’s [3] model’s for nations in and out of conflict defined the
variables that would be of interest in each region. The variables required in Neumann’s [3]
models will be pertinent to predict future conflict transitions. The regression equations define
each variable based on the rest of the data. Each regression model was built with the goal
of achieving the most parsimonious model from the other variables in the data. Before the
regression models were built and reduced, the data set required certain variables generated
by Neumann’s research be created using the complete data. Van Buuren [17] stressed the
importance of completing all imputations before generating any additional variables. Some
variables that are derivatives of other data didn’t require their own regression models since
their values in future scenarios would be calculated after each iteration.
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3.4.1 Variable Development
After filling all the missing gaps in the data, variables of interest were developed to match
the data set of previous works by Neumann [3] and Shallcross [2]. A government variable
was created based on the values of the polity IV variable to indicate a nation’s government
type. The six categories of this variable are mapped accordingly in Table 4.
Table 4. Goverment Type Mapping from Polity
Original Polity Value Government Type Number Government Type
-10 to -6 0 Autocratic
-5 to 5 1 Emerging Democracy
6 to 10 2 Democratic
-66 3 Foreign Interruption
-77 4 Anarchy
-88 5 Transitional
The percent border conflict is consistent with the percent border conflict variable in the
Neumann [3] data and border conflict variable from Shallcross [2] and Boekestein [8] works.
The percent border conflict is calculated by summing the product of all the percentages
that a neighboring nation borders a country of interest and the neighboring countries HIIK
intensity level for a given year. Islands were assumed to have no neighboring countries and a
zero percent border conflict. The equation below defines the percent border conflict variable.
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PctBCij =
n∑
k=1
Hkjpkwhere
n = number of bordering countries for country i
Hkj = HIIK conflict intensity level for country k in year j
pk = percent of border country i shares with county k (1)
i = Country ∈ {1, 2, ..., 182}
j = Year ∈ {2004, ..., 2015}
k = Bordering country
The average border conflict measures the average HIIK conflict intensity around a given
country in a given year and is consistent with Neumann’s [3] average border conflict variable.
Islands are treated as having no bordering countries. The calculation for the average border
conflict is defined as follows.
AvgBCij =
∑n
k=1Hkj
n
where
n = number of bordering countries for country i
Hkj = HIIK conflict intensity level for country k in year j (2)
i = Country ∈ {1, 2, ..., 182}
j = Year ∈ {2004, ..., 2015}
k = Bordering country
The binary border conflict variable is consistent with the binary border conflict variable
in both the Neumann [3] and Leiby [9] studies. It is a binary representation for a given
country if one of their neighboring nations meets or exceeds a certain conflict intensity in a
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given year. Islands are again assumed to have a zero score as they are not neighbored by
any nations. Binary border conflict score is defined for a given country as follows.
BinBCij =

1 if Hkj ≥ 3 for any country bordering country i
0 otherwise
Hkj = HIIK conflict intensity level for country k in year j (3)
i = Country ∈ {1, 2, ..., 182}
j = Year ∈ {2004, ..., 2015}
k = Bordering country
The dependent variable, conflict transition, is a binary representation if a country has
changed conflict statuses since the previous year. Conflict status is defined by mapping a
country’s HIIK conflict intensity level in a given year. HIIK scores of 0, 1, and 2 are mapped
to a 0 for that country’s conflict status and indicate a year that country is not in conflict.
HIIK scores of 3, 4, and 5 are mapped to a conflict status of 1 and represent a year that
country is in state of conflict. The conflict transition binary variable for a country in a given
year depends on the current and previous years conflict statuses. Conflict transition is equal
to 1 if the conflict status of a given year, i is not equal to the conflict status of the previous
year, i-1. Table 5 represents this mapping from conflict statuses for years i-1 and i to the
binary conflict transition variable in year i.
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Table 5. Mapping of Conflict Transition
Conflict Status Yr i− 1 Conflict Status Yr i Conflict Transition Yr i
0 = Not In Conflict 0 = Not In Conflict 0 = Not In Conflict
1 = In Conflict 1 = In Conflict 0 = Not In Conflict
0 = Not In Conflict 1 = In Conflict 1 = In Conflict
1 = In Conflict 0 = Not In Conflict 1 = In Conflict
3.4.2 Individual Variable Model Building Procedure
Linear regression models were built for variables that were significant in Neumann’s [3]
logistic regression models that predict a country’s conflict transition. Multiple linear regres-
sion models were built to statistically define each individual variable of interest based on the
predictor variables in a given region. These relationships are assumed to be approximated
by a straight line [23]. For multiple linear regression with k variables, the regression equation
takes the form [24]:
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ...+ βkxk +  (4)
The coefficients are the estimated impact that variable has on the dependent variable
with an error term (). For example, the coefficient βi can be interpreted as the estimated
change in the response variable for a one unit increase in variable xi, when all other predictor
variables are held constant [24]. The regression parameters are unknown, so a point predic-
tion of an observed value of the dependent variable is then calculated where b0, b1, b2, ..., bn
denote point estimates of the unknown parameters [23].
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yˆ = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + ...+ bkxk (5)
The regression parameters are estimated in multiple linear regression by minimizing the
sum of squared differences between the observed, yi and predicted, yˆi values of the dependent
variable for the ith observation [23]. This is known as the sum of squared residuals (for
i = 1, 2, .., n) and written as follows.
SSE =
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)2 (6)
Using the least squares to calculate the coefficients’ point estimates, higher order terms
and interaction terms were tested in these models, but due to the higher initially achieved
R2adj values and desire of parsimony, models were first only build using the main effects.
The complete data set used to build the models consists of all five of the imputed data sets
stacked on top of each other. This goes against Van Buuren’s [17] advice to run regressions
on each imputed data set and then pool the resulting models, but due to the desire for point
estimates defining each variable of interest, the simpler method of stacking the imputations
was preferred. With less than 10% of the observations missing from the two new world regions
of interest, the research is impacted less from the influence of missing data. The stacked
imputed data results inm x n complete records wherem was still the number of imputed data
sets and n were the influential, observed and imputed variables. The statistical analysis thus
becomes a weighted linear regression with a weighted factor of 1/m applied to each record.
Based on relatively lower percent missingness and unbiased point estimates, it is sufficient to
build individual variable regressions from the imputed data treated as a stacked, long data set
for the purposes of this research[17]. By generating five imputed data sets, analyzing them
separately to decide each univariate method, and stacking them to develop a single model,
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the imputation scope of this research is narrowed, but due to relatively smaller differences
between imputed data sets and taking a more efficient approach, individual regression models
was built and not five, one for each imputed data sets and pooling the resulting models’
regression parameters.
Stepwise regression is the primary method used to generate parsimonious linear regression
models for each variable. This method iteratively removes predictor variables while com-
puting a linear regression model each time. Each time a regression is rerun, each predictor
variable’s associated p value is assessed to see if it is within a specified and acceptable range.
By deleting variables from the model, the precision of point estimates remaining in the model
are improved [25]. The stepwise method was run using JMP with a chosen p value of 0.05
for entering and removing variables. Stepwise regression operates in a forward or backward
direction to either enter or remove a term with the smallest or largest acceptable p value.
The mixed direction option in JMP alternates between a forward and backward selection
to include the most significant terms that satisfy the probability for entering or removing
terms [26]. The iterative stepwise model calculates the p value of each variable with an F
test where the hypothesis test is whether the regression coefficient of that variable is equal
to zero. A significant variable’s p value would indicate that variable’s regression coefficient
has a value other than zero and actually influences the dependent variable. Models were
built by stepping from a null and full model using the mixed selection method. Most times
the reduced models were the same, but if there were any differences between starting with
a full or null model, the model that achieved the higher R2adj was chosen. The coefficient of
multiple determination, R2, is a measure of model adequacy that represents the proportion
of variance explained by the regression [25]. Adding regressors to the model will improve R2
but can still produce a worse model and a larger mean square error from losing one degree
of freedom for error [25]. A low value of R2 for this research indicates a poorly specified
model [25]. R2 will never decrease from adding a variable to the model, so it is important
in variable selection to include another evaluation statistic. R2adj will only improve if the
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variable added reduces the residual mean square to prevent overfitting [25]. R2 relates to
R2adj as follows [23].
R2 = Explained variationTotal variation =
∑(yˆi − y¯)2∑(yi − y¯)2 (7)
R2adj =
(
R2 − k
n− 1
)(
n− 1
n− (k + 1)
)
(8)
This research will reference R2adj when evaluating models in stepwise regression. Inter-
action terms were also selectively included in models with insufficient R2adj (<0.5). In an
effort to develop parsimonious models, only second order interaction terms were considered.
With the interaction terms factored into the model, the Arab region produced 74 possible
variables while there were 209 possible variables in the Southeast Asia region. Stepwise
regression reduced these numbers for the models requiring higher R2adj. All of the Arab re-
gion models were built with interactions, but only population growth’s regression equation
required interaction terms in the Southeast Asia region.
3.4.3 Assessing Model Adequacy
The final stepwise models were analyzed to ensure they met all the assumptions of linear
regression. Linear Regression assumes the error terms or residuals must be independent,
normal, and random variables with mean of zero and constant variance σ2 [24]. Graphically,
these linear regression assumptions can be evaluated using a normal probability plot of the
residuals and a plot of the standardized residuals against the predicted values. A normal
probability plot of the residuals is a quantile-quantile plot where quantiles of a particular
distribution are plotted against the quantiles of the standard normal distribution to identify
deviations from normality [24]. If a distribution is normal then a majority of the points in the
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graph should fall close to the diagonal reference line. Statistically, there are lot of different
ways to test normality with each depending on the data at hand. The deviations from
normality were calculated using the Cramer-Von Mises test where the null hypothesis is that
the distribution of the errors follows a normal distribution. It is a simplified version of the
Anderson-Darling test that does not provide as much weight to the tails of the distribution.
It is not the most powerful empirical distribution test, but this research choose to have more
slightly relaxed normality standards. The Cramer-Von Mises statistic is calculated as,
CVM = 112n +
n∑
i=1
[F0(x(i))− 2i− 12n ]
2 (9)
where n is the sample size and xi’s are the ordered data [27]. P value scores lower than 0.05
indicate a regression model whose errors do not follow a normal distribution. The package
oslrr [28] in R was used to test the normality of each variable of interests’ residuals.
A plot of the standardized residuals against the predicted values helps identify patterns
in the variance of a model’s residuals. Linear regression assumes homoscedasticity, constant
variance, and independence of a model’s error terms [25]. These plots tests both of these
assumptions and should not represent any clear funnel, linear, u-shape, or any patterns. If
the variance of the errors is increasing or decreasing over time, confidence intervals for new
predictions will tend to be unrealistic. The plots should be evenly spread out and distanced
from the x-axis [24]. Statistically, these assumptions are tested using the Breusch-Pagan
test for homogeneity of variances from the olsrr [28] package in R. Breusch-Pagan is a
chi-squared test where the null hypothesis is that the error variances are all equal versus the
alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables
[29]. The goal is for a model to fail to reject the Bresuch-Pagan’s test which was rarely the
case for the regression models developed and explained fully in the Analysis and Results
Section 4.2.
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3.4.4 Transformations
Certain variables regression models were improved by transforming their dependent vari-
ables which either linearized the model or stabilized its variance. These variable transfor-
mations were chosen heuristally by looking for model’s with poor R2adj values or insignificant
normality or homoscedasticity statistics. If a transformation improved any of these these
categories then the model’s dependent variable was transformed moving forward. The plots
of the residuals versus fitted values of the dependent variable and actual versus predicted
dependent variable values were also examined for any patterns or non linearity. The square
root was taken for the population density variable in the Arab region (
√
PopulationDensity).
The transformation yielded a higher R2adj but didn’t improve the model’s homoscedasticity
or normality violations. The log was taken for a few variables which helped some of those
models to fulfill the assumptions of linear regression (log(yi) = β0 + β1x1i + ...+ βkxki + ei).
Mobile cell subscriptions in the Southeast Asia region was transformed initially just by
the square root, but the model continued to improve further by then taking the fourth root
( 4
√
MobileCellSubscriptions). JMP offered other transformations that were tested but didn’t
improve any other models or the three transformed (log, square root, and fourth root). Even
after the transformations were performed, the regression models didn’t statistically meet all
of the assumptions of linear regression. This research recognizes the inadequacies of the
models, but accepts them, and will proceed with the individual variables’ regression models
to develop alternative futures of world conflict.
3.5 Single Step Iterative Alternative Futures Method
With the data properly imputed and regression models built for each variable of interest,
the alternative futures were then developed. An iterative explanatory approach inspired by
univariate imputation technique, stochastic regression was primarily applied to generate the
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complete future data sets. For each region individually, Neumann’s [3] conflict prediction
models were applied each year to find a probability of a country transitioning in or out of
a state of conflict. Each variable value would be calculated using the previous years values.
This was done by using the regression equations created based on the other variables of
interest in their respective region. To improve on the predicted value of these equations,
random noise was added to the predicted value. This noise introduces variability that re-
flects the inherent inaccuracy associated with predicting variables from an insufficient subset
of variables. Van Buuren [17] injects noise from a random draw from the normal distribu-
tion based on the assumption that the observed data are normally distributed around the
regression line. Due to the regression equations largely violating this assumption, the noise
instead came from a random draw from the empirical distribution of each model’s residuals.
Before Neumann’s [3] conflict transition logistic regressions could be applied, the complete
predicted data for the next year were assessed for operational feasibility. This varied by
region and variable, but the variables’ values were restricted to not exceed two times the
region’s largest value and one half of the region’s smallest value recorded in the last ten
years. Exceptions to this rule were made for trade (% of GDP) and life expectancy. Two
times the maximum regional values for these variables were unrealistic ceilings, so these two
variables maximums were just set to the region’s historic largest observed values. Negative
and infeasible resulting variable values from the individual regression equations prompted
each region’s model being run many times before operationally feasible results were achieved
with the previously stated limits. These conservative limits placed on the prediction values
plus the noise eliminated variables reaching inconceivable highs or lows and maintained the
operational relevancy of this research.
Certain variables identified as significant to predicting conflict transitioning were calcu-
lated based on the new variables’ values rather than by their own regression equations with
noise projections. Some variables were deemed difficult to impact and assumed not to be
changing over the years. The two year conflict intensity trend of a country was calculated
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manually based on the previous year’s HIIK conflict intensity score minus the country’s HIIK
conflict intensity score from two years ago all divided by six for the different HIIK levels.
The regime and government type variables were assumed not to change year to year because
they were believed to be impervious to conflict changes. All 45 of the analyzed nations’
government and regime types never changed over the past ten years. For the hard to change
variables, the iterative forecast method treated a nation’s political system as fixed through
the course of any conflict transitions. The HIIK conflict intensity level each year was cal-
culated based on the probability that a nation would transition in or out of conflict. The
new year’s data would be plugged into Neumann’s logistic regression equations depending
on the conflict status of the previous year. From there the predicted probability values of the
logistic regression would be converted into a binary indicator of remaining or transitioning
conflict states. Recall that the logit transformed logistic regression is is defined as follows
[24].
g(x) = ln( p(x)1− p(x)) = β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βkxk (10)
The formula for logistic regression contains p, the probability and k, the number of
variables. To solve for p, the exponential of the predicted value of logistic regression was
divided by one plus the same exponential of the predicted value from the logistic regression.
The antilog of the predicted value of Neumann’s [3] equations can be interpreted as the
estimated probability of changing conflict statuses.
p(x) = exp(β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βkxk)1 + exp(β0 + β1x1 + ...+ βkxk)
(11)
A higher probability indicates that a nation has a greater chance of transitioning conflict
statuses while a smaller probability means a country’s conflict status will remain at the same
level of conflict for that year. A 0.5 probability cutoff was used to decided which direction a
country would behave: transition or stationary. A random draw was taken between 0 and 1
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to compare to the calculated transition probability. The random draw comparison represents
the uncertainty that given a country’s probability to transition conflict statuses, a country
may not actually transition in the direction the logistic regression equations found to have
the highest probability. If the random draw, in the direction of transition or remaining
the same exceeds the logistic regression equation’s probability of conflict transition then the
country’s conflict will in fact not do what the model predicts. For example, if a country was
in conflict last year and the in conflict equation for that region found a transition probability
of 0.91, the country is likely to transition to being out of conflict. A random draw would be
taken between 0 and 1, and say the random draw was 0.95, than due to the random draw
exceeding the transition probability in the likely transition direction, than the country would
remain in conflict.
HIIK conflict intensity was mapped each year based on the conflict transition probability
and random draw comparison. If a country, after taking and comparing the random draw,
transitions in the direction indicated by the transition probability than the HIIK conflict
intensity was just mapped following the below mapping.
Table 6. Previous Year In Conflict Mapping HIIK Conflict Intensity
Random Draw Comparison Conflict Status Year i Year i HIIK Mapping
Transition and Does Not In Conflict (1-5/6) = 0
(5/6-4/6) = 1
(4/6-3/6) = 2
Transition and Doesn’t In Conflict 3
Remain and Does In Conflict (3/6-2/6) = 3
(2/6-1/6) = 4
(1/6-0) = 5
Remain and Doesn’t Not In Conflict 2
For a country that was in conflict the previous year, the random draw comparison column
reads transition when the transition probability calculated using Nuemann’s [3] in conflict
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logistic regression equations yield a probability over 0.5. If the random draw is larger than
the transition probability, the column will read “transition and doesn’t”. Since the country’s
conflict is behaving contradictory to how the equations predict, the HIIK conflict intensity
is mapped to being the lowest in conflict score of 3. Otherwise, the column reads “transition
and does”“, meaning the country for that year transitions to not in conflict and it’s HIIK
conflict intensity is inversely mapped based on an even division between 0.5 and 1 for the
out of conflict HIIK conflict intensity scores. The same approach is taken when a country in
conflict is supposed to stay in conflict (transition probability < 0.5) except now the country
will only do the opposite of the predicted transition probability if the random draw is less
than the transition probability. In the case that the random draw is that small and the
country doesn’t stay in conflict, HIIK conflict intensity is set as the lowest not in conflict
score of 2. When the previously in conflict country should remain in conflict and does, the
transition probability is directly mapped to the top three HIIK in conflict scores based on an
even division of 0.5 to 0 as seen above. The proceeding mapping of a country that was not
in conflict the previous year is mapped in the same manor but with some of the mappings
flipped accordingly.
Table 7. Previous Year Not In Conflict Mapping HIIK Conflict Intensity
Random Draw Comparison Conflict Status Year i Year i HIIK Mapping
Transition and Does In Conflict (1-5/6) = 5
(5/6-4/6) = 4
(4/6-3/6) = 3
Transition and Doesn’t Not In Conflict 2
Remain and Does Not In Conflict (3/6-2/6) = 2
(2/6-1/6) = 1
(1/6-0) = 0
Remain and Doesn’t In Conflict 3
HIIK conflict intensity was an important variable to map as it was included in multiple
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variables’ individual regression equations previously built. It depends on the conflict status
of a country, so it was calculated iteratively each year after the transition probability equa-
tions were already applied. With the HIIK conflict properly mapped and conflict transition
logic developed, alternative futures were generated based on the trends from each variables’
regression equations. The alternative futures were calculated from projections of the first of
the five imputed sets. Each imputed data set could be interpreted as another set of alter-
native futures, but due to the scope of this research and slight differences between imputed
data sets, only projections were developed initially and for the proceeding regional what-if
scenarios from one of the complete, imputed data sets.
3.5.1 Conduct What-If Alternative Futures Analysis
The alternative futures created from unrestricted flow of the data into the future based
on their individual regression equations were tested by scenarios a region may possibly face.
These scenarios were implemented by manipulating how a certain variable behaves in the
projected future yearly observations. Each region, having different predictive conflict models,
was subject to slightly different variable trends in order to test a certain scenario. The three
conflict what-if scenarios that were tested are listed as follows.
1. Does peace beget peace?
2. Is democracy the most peaceful form of governance?
3. How does trade impact the conflict environment of a region?
Answering each of these questions differed between the two regions of focus. For the Arab
nations, the first question was tested simply by forcing the future years of projected percent
of border conflict variable to be zero. The idea behind this trend is to understand how
nation’s conflict will change depending on if their neighboring nations become nonviolent
for the foreseeable future. Does peace surrounding nations in this region permeate across
borders? The second questions was aimed to understand the impact that a democratic form
39
of government would have on a nation’s conflict status and trends. The categorical variable
government type used in the Neumann [3], Shallcross [2], and Leiby [9] studies represents
a nation’s government ranging from autocratic to democratic. The dummy variable for an
emerging democratic government type was the only variable of interest in the Arab region
that could be manipulated to invoke democracy in the region. This was the closest variable
in the Arab region’s Neumann [3] logistic regression model which would simulate prescribed
democracy’s effect.
The first question in the Southeast Asian region was addressed by altering both the
binary variable of border conflict and continuous variable average border conflict for each
nation. The binary border conflict indicator was forced to zero for the proceeding sixteen
years of projected data to represent bordering nations not being in conflict; not a single
bordering nation would score above a two on the HIIK conflict intensity barometer. The
average border conflict variable was restricted to not exceed a value of two which meant on
average, no bordering nations would be in conflict. The second question’s scenario was set
by fixing every future regime type variable developed by Goldstone [5] to be democracies
along with creating a floor for the freedom score variable. Freedom score is calculated by
averaging a nation’s civil liberties and political rights. Boekestein [8] created the variable
to model a nation’s political climate and oppression. This variable relates to government
type, so the minimum freedom score was increased to that of the countries in the region with
democratic governments. In conjunction with the preset regime type, this simulated a trend
of democratic governance in the region.
The third question was addressed in the same way for both regions even thought there
were vast differences between the regions’ average trade as a percentage of a nation’s GDP.
Explained by Boekestein [8], the variable for trade is calculated from the summation of two
World Bank statistics: imports of goods and services (% of GDP) added to exports of goods
and services (% of GDP). The question posses the possibility of extreme trade decreases due
to possible isolationistic, uncertain trade behaviors in a region where trade was disrupted
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by political instability or outside pressures. The trade variable’s maximum capacity was
amended to be the minimum historical observed trade that a nation in that region ever
operated under. This limited each nation’s trading engagement to test how a scenario of
shrunken trade may impact a nation’s future conflicts.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the results and analysis of applying the methodology outlined in
Chapter 3. Each variable of interest’s regression models are analyzed in Section 4.2. Section
4.3 discusses the results from the data driven alternative futures of country conflict. Section
4.3 discusses the specified what-if scenarios and resulting impact on conflict in the Arab
region. Section 4.5 covers the alternative futures of what-if scenarios in the Southeast Asia
grouping of countries.
4.2 Regional Individual Regression Model Evaluation
Certain variables were related to other variables of interest which made them easier to
explain using linear regression, but some variables were hard to change and had weaker
relationships to the rest of that region’s data. Generally, linear regression is able to capture
the relationship between variables. Regression results in an ability to predict variable levels
given the most recent value, each variable’s relationships, and analysis of error terms. These
individuals regression models based on historical data are evaluated using the information
in Table 8.
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Table 8. Regression Model Adequacy Check
R2 R2adj F-Test Normality Homoscedasticity Transformation
Arab Mobile Cell Subs 0.6017 0.5961 <0.0001 0.0027 0.5125 Log
Arab Population Density 0.8569 0.8471 <0.0001 0.0016 <0.0001 Square Root
Arab Percent Border Conflict 0.8363 0.8255 <0.0001 0.0132 0.0304 None
Arab Fertility Rate 0.8797 0.8725 <0.0001 0.0294 <0.0001 None
Arab Trade (% of GDP) 0.7261 0.7138 <0.0001 0.0018 0.8278 None
SE Asia Internet Users 0.8045 0.8020 <0.0001 0.0126 <0.0001 None
SE Asia Life Expectancy 0.9006 0.8994 <0.0001 0.0070 0.0125 None
SE Asia Mobile Cell Subs 0.7176 0.7148 <0.0001 0.0131 <0.0001 Fourth Root
SE Asia Infant Mortality Rate 0.8421 0.8404 <0.0001 0.0127 <0.0001 None
SE Asia Population Growth 0.9359 0.9284 <0.0001 0.0858 <0.0001 None
SE Asia Arable Lands 0.8210 0.8192 <0.0001 0.0149 0.0201 Log
SE Asia Avg Border Conflict 0.9351 0.9343 <0.0001 0.0567 <0.0001 None
SE Asia Freshwater per Capita 0.6633 0.6588 <0.0001 0.0046 <0.0001 Log
The Arab region’s models achieved at worst, a R2adj of 59.61% for mobile cell subscriptions.
This indicates the models, on a whole, sufficiently explain the variation of the predicted
variables adjusted for the number of predictors in each model. The Cramer-Von Mises test
found no variables’ models for the Arab region that significantly satisfied the assumption
of normally distributed residuals. On the other hand, mobile cell subscriptions and trade
(% of GDP) regression models produced insignificant Breusch-Pagan tests where the null
hypothesis was that the variance of the model’s residuals is constant. To learn how well each
variable was explained in a given country, the residuals were broken down for each nation’s
defined linear regression models. Within the Arab region, the variables, population density
and trade (% of GDP) were the two with the highest residuals or least well defined. Based on
the Breusch-Pagan statistic, they both scored the highest of the Arab variables of interest
for being the least homoscedastic. Morocco and Syria each had the highest, abnormally
large residuals within population density and trade (% of GDP) respectively, and the Untied
Arab Emirates had large residuals for both of these variables of interest. The studentized
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residuals, scaled by the exact standard deviation and used to identify outliers, found there
to be outliers within four variables’ models: percent border conflict, trade (% of GDP),
population density, and fertility rate [23]. There was some overlap with the larger residuals
and those studentized residuals greater than three which is the threshold used to identify
an outlier [23]. Syria contained outlier residuals in percent border conflict and trade (%
of GDP) while Tunisia included an instance of abnormal studentized residual in its model
of percent border conflict. The United Arab Emirate’s population density linear regression
predicted an outlier within its studentized residuals. Yemen’s fertility rate model was the
only other instance of a studentized residual greater than three. It is difficult to attribute
these poor regression fits to any direct conflict trends as they, along with other countries, all
had varying likelihoods to enter conflict when the alternative futures were generated based
on each variables of interest’s regressions.
In Table 8, the Southeast Asia region’s regression models are evaluated on model per-
formance and ability to maintain the assumptions of normally distributed variance with
constant variance. The models or each variable of interest achieved at worst, a R2adj of
65.88% for the freshwater per capita. Of the Cramer-Von Mises tests’ results, only two
variables, population growth and average border conflict didn’t violate the linear regression
assumption that the model’s residuals followed a normal distribution. The Breusch-Pagan
test found no models of the Southeast Asia countries’ variables of interest to have signifi-
cantly constant variance of their errors. Taking a closer look at the each individual model’s
residuals by country, various variables performed especially poor for a few nations. Based on
the ranges of each models’ residuals, GDP per capita stands out as disproportionately having
the largest residuals compared to the other variables of interests’ models. It is difficult to
tell, with the greater number of variables of interest for this region, which specific countries
contain poorly performing models, so the studentized residuals were calculated to identify
outlying values that would indicate poor fits. Table 9 identifies each of the variables models
that contained an instance of a studentized residual greater than three and the corresponding
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country.
Table 9. Studentized Residual Identified Weak SE Asia Individual Regression Models
Country Variables
Bangladesh Avg Border Conflict
Brunei GDP per Capita
China Mobile Cell Subs
Papua New Guinea Trade (% of GDP)
Philippines Internet Users
Singapore Population Growth and Population Density
Solomon Islands Population Growth
Timor-Leste Population Growth and Military Expend GDP
Table 9 shows that Singapore and Timor-Leste both contained studentized residuals
greater than the standard cutoff for outlier analysis. Both of these nations, despite being
poorly explained by the models for two variables each, had different conflict trends in the
original data driven alternative futures. Singapore experienced an average absolute changes
in all three conflict measurements, but Timor-Leste had similar conflict rates of transitions
and likelihoods as historically observed.
4.3 Alternative Futures Models’ Results and Evaluation
The regional, generic imputation style alternative futures model was first run with only
operational bounds constraining the values of each variable of interest. The data’s relation-
ships and injected noise was able to determine the directions of each nation’s future conflict
transitions. To evaluate the model’s statistical possibility, three metrics were calculated for
each alternative future and averaged across all five repetitions. These statistics helped to
understand the differences between future conflict behaviors and the observed historic data
for each nation. Each evaluation metric was calculated for the past ten years of observed
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data and future sixteen years of projected alternative futures. The rates of transitions were
found over each past or future time period by counting the times a nation transitioned con-
flict status divided by the number of years in that period. For example, if a nation remained
in conflict for the entirety of the projected future years then it would have transitioned zero
times over sixteen years. Its rate of transitions for that nation’s alternative future would be
zero. The rates of transitions give insight into how closely the alternative futures are from
the historic rates of conflict beginnings and stoppages in a specific nation. Conflict likeli-
hood was calculated similarly; a nation’s total number of years in conflict were divided by
the total years in that period of time. By finding the likelihood of each nation’s alternative
future, comparing the models’ conflict likelihoods provides the feasibility of that alternative
future. Expanding on this idea, the most recent conflict likelihoods were calculated for the
three past years (2012-2014) of observed data and the first three future, projected conflict
statuses (2015-2017). Comparing the most recent conflict likelihood gives knowledge into
the more short term similarities and differences between the alternative futures predictions
and reality.
The Arab region in the past ten years has experienced 98 violent conflicts across seven-
teen countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank, and Yemen.
The generic imputation driven forecasting model projected country conflict from 2015 to
2030 based on the past ten years of completed data. The model projected future conflict
replications multiple times to create five individual alternative futures for each country. The
average predicted country conflicts across all five futures was 134.2 violent conflicts for the
first ten years of future data, 2015-2025. The associated minimum and maximum total con-
flicts for a single future’s over ten years were 125 and 145 respectively. Even on the lower end
of projected future conflicts, there appears to be larger estimates of total conflicts that the
data driven model predicts for the Arab region. Figure 2 plots the yearly average conflicts
observed across all five repetitions of the future Arab regional data versus years.
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Figure 2. Arab Region’s Original Alternative Futures’ Average Yearly Conflicts
Historical data on and to the left of the dashed line represents the region’s observations
from 2004 to 2014. Over those years there was a large jump in average yearly conflicts
around 2010 followed by a short couple year period of no trend. By year, there appears to
be an initial dip in the average Arab conflicts once the projected, future years begin, but as
the data are projected further into the future, average yearly conflicts are positively growing
at a slightly decreasing rate. Therefore, number of conflicts is predicted to trend slightly
upward.
The variable behaviors that appeared to indicate a tendency for conflict were low fertility
rate, low trade (% of GDP), high mobile cell subscriptions, high population density, and high
percent border conflict. These characteristics seemed common between the countries that
experienced longer periods in conflict. Only one of the data driven model’s five alternative
futures predicted that Algeria, a country historically in a state of conflict for the past ten
years would actually remain in conflict. The other four futures generally predicted that
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Algeria would transfer out of conflict right away (2015) for about three to four years and
then return to a state of conflict. These trends are seen in Figure 3 where each repetition’s
HIIK conflict score from the past and future are plotted over the years. Four alternative
futures experienced nonviolence in Algeria immediately following the end of observed, past
data.
0
1
2
3
4
5
2010 2020 2030
Year
H
IIK
 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2010 2020 2030
Year
H
IIK
 2
0
1
2
3
4
5
2010 2020 2030
Year
H
IIK
 3
0
1
2
3
4
5
2010 2020 2030
Year
H
IIK
 4
0
1
2
3
4
5
2010 2020 2030
Year
H
IIK
 5
Figure 3. Algeria’s Original Alternative Futures’ Repeated HIIK Conflict Intensities
The average absolute changes for the three alternative futures evaluation measures showed
the rate of transitions only changing by 0.138 across all the countries and replications. The
conflict likelihood changed by an average of 0.387 from the past ten years of country conflict
likelihoods. The more recent (three year) conflict likelihoods were slightly closer to the recent,
historic regional conflict likelihood. In the short term and sixteen years of future conflicts
the likelihood of violent conflicts deviated the farthest from the historic conflict likelihoods,
but the future rates of transitions were relatively similar to the observed historical data’s
rates of conflict transitioning. The likelihood of conflict in the region changed, generally
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trending upwards. The alternative futures on average experienced a higher likelihood of
nation’s being in conflict and remaining in that state.
The Southeast Asia regional alternative futures model was applied to iteratively project
each variable into the future and shape possible conflict trends. In the past ten years,
the Southeast Asia region has experienced 136 violent conflicts throughout its 28 nations.
Allowing five replications of alternative futures and letting the data’s relationships dictate
their own trends over time, an average of 131.4 violent conflicts were predicted for the first
projected, future ten years. There was a minimum of 126 and maximum of 138 violent
conflicts predicted by an individual alternate future replication, and interestingly, the data
driven alternative futures method applied in a different region outputted an opposite trend
for a decade’s overall conflict occurrences. Figure 4 plots the yearly average conflicts observed
across all five repetitions of the future Southeast Asia regional data versus years.
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Figure 4. Southeast Asia Region’s Original Alternative Futures’ Average Yearly Conflicts
The past ten years of conflicts in Southeast Asia, on and to the left of the dashed line,
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averaged around twelve conflicts per year. The first five years of projected, future ten years’
average conflicts dropped to about ten average yearly conflicts. The first five years observed
a lot of nations exit conflict, but despite the initial regional peace, the alternative futures
once again saw conflicts rebound to a similar range. Although over ten years, the conflicts in
Southeast Asia are forecasted to decline based of this model’s results. The Southeast Asia’s
average yearly conflicts behave similarly to those in Arab region. There is a much greater
relative decrease in conflict occurrences initially in Southeast Asia, but both region’s average
yearly conflicts declined at first, followed by growth at a decreasing rate.
There weren’t any recognizable variables’ behaviors that were common to country’s with
futures of prolonged non violence. The region seemed to experience few sustained years
of peace or hostilities. Rather than experiencing years of peace or violence, most nations
transitioned in and out of conflict at much higher rates than historically experienced. This
resulted in an 0.347 absolute change in the rate of transitions, meaning countries were chang-
ing conflict statuses relatively quicker over the course of the alternative futures. There were
no replicated countries’ alternative futures that experienced a likelihood of conflict greater
than 0.5 which is a vast regional decrease from the Arab nations’ likelihoods of being in
conflict. Of all the replicated alternative futures, North Korea had the highest average and
max rates of transitions as well as one of the highest average future conflict likelihood. North
Korea stood out in the region and experienced average absolute changes in all three of its
individual alternative futures metrics. Figure 5 presents the HIIK conflict intensity scores of
North Korea for each repetition against years. It’s clear that North Korea, although being
one of the countries to transition the fastest in Southeast Asia, transitioned between the far
extremes of the HIIK conflict intensity barometer multiple times in all five repetitions. It
trended towards the furthestmost environment of peace, HIIK conflict score of zero or the
other extreme of war, HIIK conflict score of five. With the data driven model, nations in
the Southeast Asia region underwent serious instability as nations’ seemed more likely to
be in either no conflict or war with few instances of intermediate HIIK conflict levels. This
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may be an instance where analysis of a particular country may be better served outside
of the alternative futures modeling construct given its uniqueness when compared to other
countries in the region.
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Figure 5. North Korea’s Original Alternative Futures’ Repeated HIIK Conflict Intensities
The model compared to the original ten years of observed data in the region on average
across all countries and repetitions predicted. The most recent conflict likelihood comparison
saw an absolute change of 0.417. The Southeast Asia region, overall will experience more
countries transitioning in and out of conflict faster, and despite the initial slight decrease in
conflict occurrences, the region’s average likelihood of conflict rose over the forecast horizon.
Although the two regions are largely different, they both predicted the smallest changes
from their region’s historic conflict behavior in rates of transitions and the greatest absolute
differences in the likelihood of longer term conflict.
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4.4 Arab Nations’ Regional Scenarios
The three regional scenarios were tested using modified versions of the purely data driven
alternative futures model. With the previously mentioned scripted behavior of the percentage
of border conflicts of a given nation, the first regional scenario was tested to understand
the regional impact of peaceful bordering nations. Despite the logical belief that peace
besets peace, the results of this regional scenario were that an overwhelming majority of
countries would enter and stay in conflict for the duration of the future sixteen years. The
peaceful borders’ alternative futures, averaged across all five replications forecasted 184.6
yearly instances of violent conflicts in countries over the first ten future years. This was nearly
double the 98 observed instances of countries in violent conflict for the most recent ten years.
The future conflicts with enacted peaceful bordering nations were about 50 conflicts more
than the original data driven alternative futures. Figure 6 illustrates the region’s propensity
towards conflict when nation’s borders become entirely peaceful. Within less than five years
after the scenario begins, the entire region of seventeen nations, enter and remain in conflict
for the remaining projected years.
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Figure 6. Arab Region’s Scenario 1 Alternative Futures’ Avearge Yearly Conflicts
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Looking closer into each individual country, only three countries across all five repetitions
experience a year not in a state of conflict. Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates entered
states of peace only within the first three years of future data while all other countries’
conflict statuses were in conflict. The noticeable variable trends associated with all of the
repeated states of conflict despite supposed peaceful bordering nations were low fertility
rates, high population densities, and high mobile cell subscribers. Conflict transitions were
influenced only when moderate levels of population density, fertility rate, trade (% of GDP),
and mobile cell subscribers existed. The peace in bordering countries does not appear to
bring peace to the Arab nations themselves. The peaceful border nations scenario had
a average absolute change of 0.108 in the rate of transitions, a 0.454 absolute change in
conflict likelihood, and the more recent conflict transitions changed by 0.188. Compared to
the purely data driven alternative futures, preset peaceful borders predicted greater changes
in only the long term likelihood of conflict. Otherwise, nation’s when surrounded by peace
were likely to be in conflict and transitioned between conflict statuses at rates more similar
to the region’s historic performance. For the most part, increased peace in bordering Arab
countries generated alternative futures of increased violent conflicts and minimal conflict
transitions back to peace.
The second scenario of complete regional democratic governance showed an improvement
in the overall Arab conflict environment. There were an average of 130.8 yearly instances
of nation’s being in a state of conflict over the first ten years of projected data. This was a
slightly smaller estimate than the data driven model, but the influence of democracies was
still higher than the total number of conflicts in the most recent ten years of observed data.
However, the all democratic governments produced average conflicts with a smaller range
than the original data driven model indicating a smaller range of ten year conflict estimates.
Figure 7 displays the region’s average yearly conflicts over time. The first ten years of the
future trended less positively than the original alternative futures. Over the future sixteen
years, the democratic alternative futures experienced an average of 12.7 yearly conflicts
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while the original, data driven futures averaged 13.0 conflicts per year. Democracy trended
the region slightly more towards peace but still prompted an increase from the historically
experienced average yearly conflicts (8.9).
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Figure 7. Arab Region’s Scenario 2 Alternative Futures’ Avearge Yearly Conflicts
Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Morocco all experienced alternative fu-
tures completely in conflict with no transitions. The years with continued violent conflicts
and no transitions out of conflict were generally explained by high mobile cell subscribers,
high population density, high percent of bordering conflicts, low fertility rates, and low trade
(% of GDP). It appeared that there was no significant impact that prescribed democracies
had on the overall conflicts within a region. This research’s three conflict measures had
similar average absolute changes as the original imputed style forecasting method: rates
of transitions, conflict likelihoods, and more recent conflict likelihoods. The only average
statistic that didn’t change from the dictated democratic regimes were the recent, three
year conflict likelihoods which projected an identical absolute change of 0.341 in conflict
likelihoods. The imposed state of democracy only improved the model’s ability to predict
conflict likelihoods more closely to the regions previous three years of conflict likelihoods.
Bahrain, Lebanon, and Morocco all saw no changes in recent conflict likelihoods across all
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five repetitions from the historic conflict transitions. This appears that with the influenced
democracies, the model produced recent (three year) conflict transitions identical to the re-
cent previous observed conflict transitions when a given nations had spent all their previous
recent years in a state of conflict. The countries that experienced the largest differences
from the historic conflict behaviors in transitions were Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,
and West Bank. Two of these countries, not surprisingly received predictions of at least
one alternative future that was in conflict all sixteen years. This reassured the model’s ten-
dency towards predicting statuses of conflict over peace region and impact of democracies
within the Arab. Neither of these nations that in future years remained solely in conflict
had previously been democratic.
The third regional scenario simulated the reduction of trade as a percentage of GDP for
each country in the Arab region. Future trade projects were set to the minimum historic trade
levels within the Arab region to force each country to trade as infrequent as operationally
feasible. Compared to the instances of conflict in the future ten years of original, data
driven alternative futures, the decreased trade model predicted very similar violent conflict
occurrences. There were 132.4 average conflicts in the first ten years of future data predictions
which was only on average about two conflicts less than the original alternative future model.
Figure 8 plots the region’s average yearly conflicts to understand the future conflict trends.
The average yearly conflicts across all future years was only a downtick from the original
alternative futures model.
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Figure 8. Arab Region’s Scenario 3 Alternative Futures’ Avearge Yearly Conflicts
Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen were all predicted for all five repetitions to be in a state of
conflict over the course of the entire forecast horizon. Of these three countries’ observed
historic conflict trends, only Yemen had experienced a perfect historic conflict likelihood,
meaning it was in conflict the entire past ten years. Bahrain and Libya both have observed
conflict likelihoods of 54.545% and 36.364%. This indicated no clear relationship between
the historic conflict likelihood and set decreased trade within each country that would lead to
consistent future years in conflict without transitions. The preset decline in future trade (%
of GDP) generated results closer to the region’s historic average rates of transitions, conflict
likelihoods, and recent (three year) conflict likelihoods. All of the average absolute changes
were the same as the original data driven alternative futures while having higher differences
between the rates of transitions and recent conflict likelihoods. Only the overall forecast
conflict likelihoods changed a few points from the historic conflict likelihood. This is likely
due to the decline in trade predicting a few less conflicts and historically the Arab region
having lower conflict occurrences and likelihoods than any alternative futures developed.
Despite a marginally less ten year conflict average, there weren’t any identifiable differences
that closed trade had on the region’s original data driven conflict statuses and transitions.
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Compared to the Southeast Asia region, the Arab nation’s didn’t on average spend as much
of their GDP’s on trade to begin with, which may make their conflict statuses robust to any
cessation of trade.
4.5 Southeast Asia’s Regional Scenarios
The three regional scenarios aimed to test for the same three possible political and eco-
nomic realities on the Southeast Asia region. Peaceful bordering nations were fixed for the
future data projections in order to see if peace would likely inspire more peace within a
region. The binary border conflict and average bordering country conflict variables were
hard coded to not allow any bordering nation exceed a HIIK score of three which means no
violent conflicts would surround a given nation during the sixteen years of projected data.
The peaceful border scenario predicted an average of 113.2 violent conflicts in Southeast
Asia region’s first ten forecasted years of data. Of the five repetitions, there was a high
estimate of 124 and low of 108 total conflicts. These summary statistics all shifted towards
much less average conflicts versus the free flowing original conflict predictions, but compared
to the total, 136 violent conflicts in the past ten years of observed data, peaceful borders
estimated much less future conflicts would arise in the next decade. The data, with its
own relationships seems to already predict future conflicts slightly trending downwards even
without peace abutting the region. Figure 9 highlights the large decrease in average yearly
conflicts brought about by peaceful border nations. The historic data observed 12.4 average
yearly conflicts while over the course of the sixteen future years, peaceful borders guaranteed
only 10.8 average conflicts occurred each year. This was also a decrease from the original
alternative futures’ 12.7 average yearly conflicts over the entire forecast horizon.
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Figure 9. Southeast Asia Region’s Scenario 1 Alternative Futures’ Average Yearly Conflicts
Between the rates of transitions, conflict likelihoods, and recent conflict likelihoods, the
first scenario didn’t majorly alter any of the average absolute changes found by the original
forecasting technique. The first scenario predicted very similar rates of transitions and
conflict likelihoods to the original, historic ten years of observed data. Only the most recent,
three years data conflict likelihoods were less similar to the original data’s most recent
likelihoods than the novel imputation style alternative futures. This means that in the
short term, when peace surrounds a Southeast Asian nation, its conflict likelihoods are less
similar to recent historic conflict likelihoods, but the further into the future those conflict
likelihood’s trend to be similar to the novel imputation forecasts. Kiribati and Mongolia were
the nations with the highest conflict likelihoods, but even these two nations had less than a
0.5 likelihood of conflict. Compared to the Arab region, these low conflict likelihoods indicate
that Southeast Asia’s conflicts are generally less probable. Kiribati, as an island would in
theory be unaffected by peaceful bordering nations, and this rise was confirmed by its conflict
likelihoods only being marginally different from the original data driven alternative futures.
The main insights from implementing peace in bordering nations were countries are less
likely to be in states of conflict in the short term and less total average conflicts occur in the
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next ten years.
The second scenario aimed to understand how set democratic governments would shift
the conflict environment of the region. The regime type for each nation was set to democratic
for the future years and freedom scores restricted to not be lower than that of any observed
democratic nation’s in the region. The prescribed democracies produced a downward ten
year shift in total conflicts compared to the historic count. Across all repetitions, an average
of 134.4 instances of nations in states of conflict were estimated which is less than the historic
136 observations. This is a slightly higher prediction than the original data driven forecasted
method meaning with democracies in place, nation’s conflicts are still going down but slightly
less than if the alternative futures were just driven by current data relationships. Figure
10 brings to light the nearly cyclical trend of average yearly conflict occurrences caused
by the rise of democracy. The democratic alternative futures averaged 13.0 conflicts per
year which wasn’t an extreme rise from the original alternative futures 12.7 average yearly
conflicts. There were however much more drastic spikes and falls which was represented by
the calculated regional higher rates of transition between conflict states.
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Figure 10. Southeast Asia Region’s Scenario 2 Alternative Futures’ Average Yearly Con-
flicts
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The democratic scenario predicted very similar, within a one or two tenths, absolute
changes of rates of transitions and recent and longer term conflict likelihoods to that of
the original alternative futures. Brunei, The Philippines, and Laos all had the highest
average likelihoods of conflict which was interesting since except for The Philippines, none
of these nations were previously governed by democracies. It is possible that the influence
of a regime change destabilized these nations rather than fostering peace there. Higher
changes in the rates of transitions were another possible outcome of the disruptive nature
that may spur from implementing democracies in a region that’s historically been more
autocratic. North Korea, Mongolia, and Samoa, of which only North Korea was previously
an autocracy, observed future rates of transitions higher than any other nation’s rates. With
the shift towards democracy, the region experienced only a few less conflicts in the ten years
of alternative futures and consistent conflict measures with the original forecasting results.
The third regional scenario imitated the impact that huge declines in trade as a percentage
of GDP would have on the Southeast Asia region of the world. Trade (% of GDP) was limited
to the lowest, historical trade levels historically practiced in the region to learn about the
resulting conflicts trends. With a serious downturn in trade, the region experienced an
average, estimated 136.6 total conflicts in the first ten years of the future; this predicted
average included counts ranging from 131 to 142 between the replications. This was the first
scenario to predict conflict to actually rise in the region compared to the 136 instances of
violent conflict observed in the past ten years. It is expected that over the course of ten
years, tensions in the region and countries conflicts would rise due to a regional cessation of
trade. Compared to the alternative futures produced from unrestricted data relationships,
the decline in trade resulted in higher average absolute changes of rates of transitions and
conflict likelihoods from the past ten years of conflicts. Nations are transitioning in and out
of conflict more and have a higher chance of being in conflict when their trade ceases to a
near halt. Figure 11 visualizes the similar average yearly conflicts between the historic and
reduced trade alternative futures. Compared to the historic average yearly conflicts (12.4), a
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cessation of trade produced a slight uptick to 12.6 average yearly conflicts which is induced
by the positively trending later, future years.
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Figure 11. Southeast Asia Region’s Scenario 3 Alternative Futures’ Average Yearly Con-
flicts
None of the three statistics used for evaluating alternative futures estimated the decreased
trade would be more similar to the historic data than the novel imputation approach’s results.
This could be attributed to ceased trade having a sweeping effect on a nation’s conflict
status due to Southeast Asia relatively allocating more of its GDP on trade. Bhutan, The
Philippines, and Singapore were the nations with the highest average likelihoods of conflict
in the alternative futures with closed off trade. Singapore historically had spent more of
their GDP on trade than any other nation, so is expected that this regional scenario would
make them a likely candidate to be heavily impacted. It was hard to determine an exact
cause for the higher conflict likelihoods, but even all of the six nations that had historically
observed no status of conflicts in the past ten years each entered at least one state of conflict
during the sixteen years of the future. That could be due to the model’s propensity to
predict conflict over non conflict or the actual negative effects of nearly closing off trade in
the region.
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Overall Conclusions
This study developed a methodology to impute open source data previously found to
be influential for predicting country conflict in two regional country groupings and found
multiple alternative futures based on an explanatory forecasting approach. Individual linear
regression models were built and evaluated for each of the variables of interest in the Arab
and Southeast Asia regions. In each region, sixteen years of future data was projected and
iteratively predicted upon to find the conflict transitions of every nation. Three regional
scenarios were posed to understand shifts in nations’ behaviors and impact on the future
conflict statuses. The results of the study led to several conclusions which are summarized
in answering the original research questions.
Question 1: How should the data set utilized in the Neumann study be im-
puted?
Utilizing and testing the MICE package in R on the data yielded interesting results. The
main tests used to compare the multiple imputed data sets by each MICE method were used
to investigate how closely the data followed the distribution of the observed data. The polity
IV variable’s missing observations were filled with knowledge provided by the regime type of a
country. The MICE algorithm was applied to each region individually with all of the possible
variables. This was done due to the assumed similarities between countries and information
provided to the imputed values from all of the variable relationships within the a given
region. Five data sets of imputed values were generated for each of the five MICE algorithms
and analyzed separately. Kolmogorov-Smirnov, non-parametric, 2-sample Anderson-Darling
tests, and diagnostic plots were used to decide the individual MICE algorithms to address
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each variable’s missingness. It seemed that generally variables containing smaller levels of
missingness were imputed using predictive mean matching while the variables with higher
percentages of missingness tended to be imputed using either classification and regression
trees or random forest algorithms. Few variables were close to following a normal distribution
or had imputed values similar to the observed distribution, so Bayesian Linear Regression
was the MICE algorithm least chosen to impute the data. Multiple imputations by chained
equations showed to be a useful method of imputation for data with many variables stricken
with varying levels of missingness.
Question 2: How can this research develop regression models for each region’s
variables of interest?
Stepwise regression was the main technique used to develop parsimonious models for each
region’s individual variables of interest. Interaction terms were tentatively applied to better
define a variable’s relationship while avoiding overfitting and creating exhaustive models.
All of the models within the Arab region included interaction terms while not every one of
the Southeast Asia’s models benefited from including variable interactions. The R2adj was
the main metric used to evaluate the reduced regression models, and between both regions
the R2adj achieved were acceptable to explain the relationships within the data. The lowest
R2adj’s between both regions’ models was 59.61%. The assumptions of linear regression were
violated by a majority of the models in both regions. None of the five models in the Arab
region satisfied the assumption of normally distributed residuals while only two of the eight
models in the Southeast Asia region fulfilled it. The assumption of constant variance of a
model’s residuals was only met by two of the five Arab regional models, but none of the
Southeast Asia variables’ models maintained homoscedasticity. Multiple transformations
were tested and applied depending their impact to a model’s R2adj and assumptions of linear
regression. This research relaxes the assumptions of linear regression in order to proceed
with explaining each variable of interest based on others in the region and predicting point
estimates for the alternative futures. Outlier analysis based on studentized residuals found
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a few countries in each region that were poorly fit by certain variables’ models, but these
countries’ alternative futures of conflict behavior didn’t stand out among the other countries
acceptably explained by the variables’ models.
Question 3: What insights, nations susceptible or impervious to transitioning
in or out conflict are identified by the generated regional conflict alternative
futures?
In the Arab region, the data alternative futures driven by the data’s relationships pre-
dicted an overall ten year increase in conflicts compared to the observed past ten years of
data. On average the alternative futures subject to no regional scenarios predicted 134.2
conflicts to arise in the next ten years opposed to 98 instances of conflict observed across
the Arab region. Conflict in the region was predicted to rise overall, and Bahrain, Kuwait,
Lebanon, and Tunisia were the four nations of the sixteen in the region that had the highest
likelihoods of conflict. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirate, and West Bank were
the countries with the least similar likelihoods of conflict compared to the nations’ previous
behaviors. The only measure that the purely data driven alternative futures didn’t predict
would have a large absolute change across the region was a smaller predicted change (0.138)
in the rates of transitions compared to the historic rates. The Arab region was transitioning
at a similar rate in and out of conflict but there was a trend of increased nations’ likelihoods
towards being in conflict over time.
The Southeast Asia region experienced different conflict trends than the Arab region’s
general rise in violent conflict. The alternative futures driven by unrestricted relationships
between the variables of interest predicted that across all countries and repetitions there
would be 131.4 conflicts in the next ten years. This is a downturn from the past ten years
of observed 136 conflicts in the region. Along with having a regional long term average
absolute change in conflict likelihood of 0.351, the model produced alternative futures’ with
short term conflict likelihoods even less than the historic likelihoods of conflict (0.417). The
average absolute change of rates of transitions in the region rose (0.351) as well, meaning
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nations are transitioning conflict statuses much more often than historically recorded. Based
on comparisons to the regional rates of transitions and long term conflict likelihood, North
Korea scored the highest making it a concerning location for future conflict. The region’s
conflicts driven by the novel imputation alternative futures appeared to decrease in total
regional conflicts for the next ten years, and during the entirety of the forecast horizon,
nations behaved more erratic than they have in the past.
Question 4: How robust are the alternatives futures of conflict transitions
when tested by regional what-if analysis scenarios?
The three scenarios generally tested on regional variables of interest were the impact of
peaceful neighboring nations, democratic regime type, and a decline in trade (% of GDP).
With peaceful bordering countries, the region’s conflicts over a ten year period nearly doubled
which still, as the original alternative futures predicted, indicates a rise in conflicts except
at an expedited rate. Contrary to the logic that peace would spread across borders, this
what-if scenario had adverse effects on the Arab region’s conflict landscape. The impact
of democracy spreading through the region didn’t have a real impact on the future conflict
predictions compared to the 134.2 conflicts forecasted by the original alternative futures
model. Democracy slightly lowered the ten year average conflict future estimate to 130.8
but still predicted a stark rise in total conflicts from the historic count. The declined trade
(% of GDP) in the Arab region’s nations had little impact on average conflicts. The scenario
produced 132.4 conflicts to occur in the next ten years which is higher than historically
shown but similar to the original alternative futures approximate. In general, the Arab
region’s future ten year’s of conflict wasn’t too sensitive to the regional scenarios besides
peaceful bordering nations driving up the violent conflicts. The region’s conflicts were still
predicted to increase by a minimum of about thirty violent conflicts regardless of the what-if
scenario.
The Southeast Asia region was slightly more responsive to the preset scenarios affect-
ing bordering nations, government, and trade. Except for the implementation of peaceful
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bordering nations, the region experienced an average increase in conflict occurrences over
ten years compared to the original alternative futures’ estimates. The peaceful bordering
nations produced a future ten year average of 113.2 conflicts which was the only scenario
to decrease from the historically observed 136 conflicts. The influence of democracy caused
134.4 conflicts on average over the future ten years while the decline in trade produced the
highest future total conflicts. The cessation of trade (% of GDP) scenario estimated 136.6
average conflicts over the next ten years which was the only scenario to exceed the historic
ten years of total conflict. All of the regional scenarios resulted in greater average absolute
changes from the historic data. The most recent, three years of conflict likelihoods and those
over the course of the future data were all larger when compared to the original alternatives
futures’ scorings. Only the scenario of peaceful border nations generated regional rates of
transitions more similar to the rates seen in the past ten years. The Southeast Asia region
saw the greatest conflict likelihood changes when each nation’s trade was restricted. This
result made sense considering that compared to the Arab region, Southeast Asia’s countries
historically spent a much higher average percentage of their GDP on trade, making it a
vulnerability of the region. The installation of democracies seemed to not have an overly
negative or positive impact on the region’s predicted conflicts. The Southeast Asia region
was largely predicted to decrease in conflict over the next ten years especially if neighbor-
ing nation’s become more peaceful. The only outcome of conflicts surpassing the historic
averages occurred when the region’s trade (% of GDP) nearly collapsed.
5.2 Significance of Research
In Issac Asimov’s science fiction novel, Foundations, a new branch of mathematics is able
to predict the future, but only on a large scale. The premise of the book is that the char-
acters analyze their galaxies alternative futures, calculate that they are likely doomed, and
take necessary actions to ensure an alternative path that stalls their society’s destruction.
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The alternative futures inform the characters’ decisions to ensure a different statistically
identified reality emanates. Foundations celebrates a fictitious, futuristic form of mathemat-
ics while in today’s age predicting the future involves much greater uncertainty. There is
a finite power to calculating the future and an inherent unknowing of whether the future
should even resemble the past. This research develops sixteen years of alternative futures for
two world regions based on past data from 2004-2014, encompassing 45 countries. These al-
ternate futures provide some regional conflict trends for consideration by military strategists
and future regional operations. The resulting conflict landscapes are meaningful, but with
the constantly changing data patterns and regional relationships, the resultant conflict tran-
sitions provide information for sensible cogitation. The regional and global military policies’
grave impact mean that deeper forecasting analyses and expert opinion must be considered
to more convincingly inform decision making.
5.3 Future Research
As part of continuing research, this study recommends multiple areas for deeper analysis
into the alternative futures of country conflict. The first area for continuing this research
is to expand the projected variables considered for each region. The scale of this entire
project could be broadened to include all of the available data. This research only developed
regression models and projected the variables identified as influential in the Neumann [3]
models, but all of the available variables could be used to define and project the entire data
set into the future. There is a greater chance of developing better fitting regression models
when more explanatory variables are considered, and a variety of regressors could raise the
level of fidelity associated with these alternative futures.
In addition to expanding the variables considered to explain each region, an alterna-
tive model reduction technique could be applied to find parsimonious models for a region.
Stepwise regression was the foremost model reduction method used in this study, but there
67
are alternate techniques that may produce different, simpler regional variable relationships.
Lasso regression is one technique which could be explored to explain each region differently
and project data into the future. Any improvements that can be made to the individual vari-
ables’ linear regression models would produce more convincing projected data and alternative
futures. This research’s imputed alternative futures method could still be developed upon
in the same manner that univariate missing data imputation methods have been progressed.
This research took a predicted point estimate plus noise approach to defining the yearly
estimates of each variable, but Van Buuren [17] identified two other univariate imputation
methods that incorporate more uncertainty: Bayesian multiple imputation and bootstrap
multiple imputation. Both of these methods take the prediction plus noise formulation one
step further by adding more parameter uncertainty. Expanding the imputation theory be-
hind the alternative futures may be a possible area of future research. Branching off from an
imputation approach, future research could analyze an entirely different supervised learning
method’s ability to iteratively predict yearly estimates. Neural Networks are a powerful su-
pervised learning method that has been used to impute data and could provide an alternate
way of projecting data.
Social Sciences have established theories that relate violent conflicts to predominant eco-
nomic or political factors. This research could be vectored to explore the social sciences
theories, and how the social sciences’ beliefs on violent conflicts are supported or rejected
by analytical techniques. Incorporating more uncertainty and information into the alter-
nate future generation would only enhance decision makers knowledge towards developing
defendable strategic and operational plans.
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Appendix A
5.4 Variable Information
Variable Source Description
BirthRate World DataBank: World Development Indicators Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people)
DeathRate World DataBank: World Development Indicators Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people)
FertilityRate World DataBank: World Development Indicators Fertility rate, total (births per woman)
InternetUsers World DataBank: World Development Indicators Internet users (per 100 people)
LifeExpectancy World DataBank: World Development Indicators Life expantancy at birth, total (years)
MobileCellSubscriptions World DataBank: World Development Indicators Total mobile celluular subscriptions
InfantMortalityRate World DataBank: World Development Indicators Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)
YouthPopulation World DataBank: World Development Indicators Population ages 0-14 (% of total)
PopulationGrowth World DataBank: World Development Indicators Population growth (annual %)
RefugeeOrigin World DataBank: World Development Indicators Refugee population by country or territory of origin
ArableLand World DataBank: World Development Indicators Arable land (hectares per person)
ImprovedWater World DataBank: World Development Indicators Improved water source (% of population with access)
PopulationDensity World DataBank: World Development Indicators Population density (people per sq. km of land area
Trade(% of GDP) World DataBank: World Development Indicators Trade as a percentage of a country’s GDP
Unemployment World DataBank: World Development Indicators Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)(national estimate)
PctBC Developed from HIIK intensity levels and border information Border conflict measure averages the % of border shared with a country times that nation’s associated HIIK score
AvgBC Developed from HIIK intensity levels and border information Border conflict measure for the average HIIK conflict intensity level surrounding a country
BinBC Developed from HIIK intensity levels and border information Border conflict indicator which indicates if at least one bordering nation is in a state of conflict
EthnicDiversity Shallcross Database Percent of dominant ethnic group
ReligiousDiversity Shallcross Database Percent of dominant religious group
FreshWaterperCapita Shallcross Database Cubic meters, average of 2007,2012,2013 data
GDPperCapita World DataBank: World Development Indicators GDP per capita growth (annual %)
MilitaryExpendGDP World DataBank: World Development Indicators Military expenditure (% of GDP)
RefugeeAsylum World DataBank: World Development Indicators Refugee population by country or territory of asylum
CaloricIntake UN Food and Agriculture Organization Caloric intake (kcal/capita/day)
2YrConflictIntensity Developed from HIIK intensity levels Change in HIIK conflict intensity between current year of observation and HIIK intensity level of current year -2
FreedomScore Developed, Freedom House Combined average of normalized civil liberties and normalized political rights
FreedomTrend2Yr Developed from freedom score Difference between freedom scores of current year -2 and current year -1
FreedomTrend3Yr Developed from freedom score Difference between freedom scores of current year -3 and current year -1
FreedomTrend5Yr Developed from freedom score Difference between freedom score of current year -5 and current year -1
DemGovType Developed from Government Type Indicator variable denoting if an observation has a democratic government or not
GovernmentType Developed from polity variable Mapping of original polity variable into six categories
RegimeType Shallcross Database Static variable indicating the type of regime for a country
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5.5 Regional Logistic Regression Models
Figure 12. Regional Country Grouping
Table 10. Arab Region In Conflict Model
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -5.5600 2.2340 -2.29 0.0128
MobileCellSubscriptions -0.0000 0.0000 -2.60 0.0093
PopulationDensity -0.0304 0.0121 -2.51 0.0121
PctBC 2.5943 0.8891 -2.92 0.0035
GovernmentType1 -1.4569 0.7558 -1.93 0.0539
GovernmentType3 -20.0807 2662.8527 -0.01 0.9940
GovernmentType4 -3.5082 1.7299 -2.03 0.0426
GovernmentType5 -5.4795 1812.3045 -0.00 0.9976
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Table 11. Arab Region Not In Conflict Model
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.8759 2.9677 -0.30 0.7679
FertilityRate 2.2693 1.3469 1.68 0.0920
Trade -0.0978 0.0379 -2.58 0.0098
2YrConflictIntensity 17.3657 5.4186 3.20 0.0014
Table 12. Southeast Asia Region In Conflict Model
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -79.0581 27.0954 -2.92 0.0035
InternetUsers -0.0676 0.0354 -1.91 0.0562
LifeExpectancy 1.0474 0.3646 2.87 0.0041
MobileCellSubscriptions -0.0000 0.0000 -2.03 0.0427
InfantMortalityRate 0.0890 0.0483 1.85 0.0650
PopulationGrowth 1.9660 0.9138 2.15 0.0314
ArableLand 3.7880 1.3064 2.90 0.0037
AvgBC -2.1159 0.7494 -2.82 0.0047
BinBC 4.9459 1.9387 2.55 0.0107
FreshWaterPerCapita 0.0001 0.0000 3.48 0.0005
2YrConflictIntensity -10.2960 3.2099 -3.21 0.0013
MilitaryExpendGDP 0.8437 0.4707 1.79 0.0731
GDPperCapita -0.0001 0.0001 -1.14 0.2543
RegimeTypeDemocratic -1.3044 0.9971 -1.31 0.1908
RegimeTypeEmergingTransitional -15.7118 1775.0073 -0.01 0.9929
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Table 13. Southeast Asia Region Not In Conflict Model
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 5.3436 2.3561 2.27 0.0233
MobileCellSubscriptions 0.0000 0.0000 2.78 0.0054
Trade -0.0632 0.0186 -3.39 0.0007
BinBC 5.9973 2.2442 2.67 0.0075
2YrConflictIntensity 16.5140 3.6093 4.58 0.0000
FreedomScore -9.8479 2.8880 -3.41 0.0006
RegimeTypeDemocratic 3.9917 3.9917 2.85 0.0044
AvgBC -1.5551 0.7725 -2.01 0.0441
GDPperCapita -0.0001 0.0001 -2.23 0.0258
PopulationDensity 0.0026 0.0011 2.41 0.0159
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Appendix B
Table 14. Arab Region Average Alternate Futures’ Performances
FROT* PROT† FCL‡ PCL§
Country Min Average Max Min Average Max
Algeria 0 0.15 0.1875 0 0.625 0.725 1 1
Bahrain 0 0 0 0.0909 1 1 1 0.5455
Egypt 0.0625 0.2125 0.5 0.2727 0.5 0.7875 0.9375 0.7272
Iraq 0.0625 0.275 0.5625 0 0.4375 0.7 0.875 1
Jordan 0.125 0.3 0.5625 0.2727 0.4375 0.6875 0.875 0.5455
Kuwait 0 0.025 0.125 0.0909 0.875 0.975 1 0.3636
Lebanon 0 0.075 0.25 0 0.625 0.9 1 1
Libya 0.125 0.3125 0.4375 0.0909 0.5 0.6625 875 0.3636
Morocco 0 0.2375 0.4375 0.2727 0.2625 0.7375 1 0.5455
Oman 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.1818 0.5625 0.7375 0.875 0.0909
Qatar 0.1875 0.2375 0.3125 0 0.6875 0.7375 0.8125 0
Saudi Arabia 0 0.175 0.375 0.1818 0.625 0.7625 1 0.0909
Syria 0.0625 0.2 0.375 0.2727 0.5625 0.7375 0.875 0.4545
Tunisia 0 0.125 0.25 0.0909 0.75 0.875 1 0.3636
United Arab Emirates 0.1575 0.2125 0.3125 0 0.625 0.675 0.6875 0
West Bank 0.125 0.3 0.4375 0 0.5625 0.725 0.875 0
Yemen 0.375 0.4125 0.4375 0 0.5625 0.5875 0.625 1
* Future average rate of transitions
† Past ten years rate of transitions
‡ Future conflict likelihood
§ Past ten years conflict likelihood
Table 15. Arab Region Average Alternate Futures’ Recent Conflict Likelihoods
FRCL* PRCL†
Country Min Average Max
Algeria 0 0.2 1 1
Bahrain 1 1 1 1
Egypt 0.6667 0.8667 1 1
Iraq 0 0.4667 1 1
Jordan 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 1
Kuwait 0.6667 0.9333 1 1
Lebanon 0.6667 0.9333 1 1
Libya 0.6667 0.8667 1 1
Morocco 0.6667 0.7333 1 1
Oman 0.3333 0.6 0.6667 0
Qatar 0.3333 0.6 0.6667 0
Saudi Arabia 0 0.4 1 1
Syria 0 0.6 1 1
Tunisia 0.6667 0.8 1 1
United Arab Emirates 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0
West Bank 0.3333 0.7333 1 0
Yemen 1 1 1 1
* Most recent future three years conflict likelihood
† Most recent past three years conflict likelihood
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Table 16. SE Asia Region Average Alternate Futures’ Performances
FROT* PROT† FCL‡ PCL§
Country Min Average Max Min Average Max
Bangladesh 0.375 0.4792 0.5 0.1818 0.375 0.3958 0.4375 0.9091
Bhutan 0.25 0.3229 0.4375 0.0909 0.1875 0.2917 0.4375 0.0909
Brunei Darussalam 0.125 0.375 0.5 0.0909 0.0625 0.2813 0.5 0.1818
Cambodia 0.375 0.4896 0.6875 0.1818 0.3125 0.3958 0.4375 0.7273
China 0.3125 0.3854 0.4375 0.1818 0.3125 0.3542 0.375 0.9091
North Korea 0.25 0.3125 0.375 1818 0.1875 0.2396 0.3125 0.1818
Fiji 0.375 0.4896 0.5625 0 0.375 0.4375 0.5 0
India 0.375 0.4479 0.5 0 0.3125 0.3854 0.4375 1
Indonesia 0.4375 0.5104 0.625 0 0.3125 0.4271 0.5 0
Kiribati 0.0625 0.2604 0.5625 0.4545 0.0625 0.1667 0.375 0.6364
Laos 0.3125 0.3333 0.375 0.0909 0.1875 0.3021 0.375 0.3636
Malaysia 0.3125 0.5104 0.875 0.2727 0.1875 0.3958 0.5 0.2727
Maldives 0.375 0.5104 0.9375 0 0.375 0.4375 0.5 0
Micronesia 0.375 0.4479 0.5 0 0.3125 0.3646 0.375 0
Mongolia 0.0625 0.3542 0.625 0 0.0625 0.2813 0.5 1
Myanmar 0.375 0.4271 0.4375 0.0909 0.3125 0.4063 0.4375 0.9091
Nepal 0.4375 0.4896 0.5 0.0909 0.375 0.4063 0.4375 0.3636
Papua New Guinea 0.5 0.6875 0.875 0 0.375 0.4688 0.5 1
Philippines 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.1818 0.125 0.3021 0.5 0.0909
Samoa 0.4375 0.4583 0.5625 0 0.25 0.3542 0.4375 0
Singapore 0.4365 0.4792 0.5 0.1818 0.25 0.4271 0.5 0.0909
Solomon Islands 0.3125 0.4375 0.5 0.3636 0.1875 0.3333 0.5 0.8182
Sri Lanka 0.3125 0.3438 0.4375 0 0.1875 0.3021 0.4375 1
Thailand 0.4375 0.4792 0.5 0.3636 0.3125 0.4063 0.5 0.3636
Timor-Leste 0 0.0936 0.25 0.1818 0 0.09375 0.25 0.0909
Tonga 0.25 0.3646 0.5 0 0.25 0.3542 0.5 0
Vanuatu 0.375 0.4063 0.5 0.2727 0.25 0.3646 0.4375 0.3636
Vietnam 0.375 0.4792 0.5 0.1818 0.375 0.3958 0.4375 0.9091
* Future average rate of transitions
† Past ten years rate of transitions
‡ Future conflict likelihood
§ Past ten years conflict likelihood
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Table 17. SE Asia Region Average Alternate Futures’ Recent Conflict Likelihoods
FRCL* PRCL†
Country Min Average Max
Bangladesh 0 0.2778 0.3333 1
Bhutan 0 0.0556 0.3333 0
Brunei Darussalam 0.3333 0.3889 0.6667 0.6667
Cambodia 0 0.1111 0.3333 1
China 0 0.1111 0.3333 1
North Korea 0 0 0 0
Fiji 0 0.3333 0.6667 0
India 0 0.1667 0.3333 1
Indonesia 0 0.1667 0.3333 1
Kiribati 0.3333 0.3889 0.6667 0
Laos 0 0.0556 0.3333 0.3333
Malaysia 0 0.0556 0.3333 1
Maldives 0.3333 0.3889 0.6667 0.6667
Micronesia 0 0.1667 0.3333 0
Mongolia 0 0.1667 0.3333 0
Myanmar 0 0.2778 0.3333 1
Nepal 0 0.0556 0.3333 0.6667
Papua New Guinea 0 0.2778 0.3333 1
Philippines 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 1
Samoa 0 0.2222 0.3333 0.3333
Singapore 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0
Solomon Islands 0 0.3333 0.6667 0
Sri Lanka 0 0.1667 0.6667 0.6667
Thailand 0 0.1111 0.3333 1
Timor-Leste 0.3333 0.3889 0.6667 0.3333
Tonga 0 0 0 0
Vanuatu 0 0.1111 0.6667 0
Vietnam 0 0.0556 0.3333 1
* Most recent future three years conflict likelihood
† Most recent past three years conflict likelihood
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